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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. 
Tasini, which concerned a publisher’s right to use previously 
published and printed copyrighted material in subsequent 
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electronic media publications,1 has stirred publishers, authors, and 
perhaps most frenetically their attorneys, to review and reassess 
their standard publishing contracts.2  The question on everyone’s 
minds is whether these agreements effectively provide for the use 
and publication of copyrighted material in the new electronic 
media formats—and if not, how can they be redrafted to comply 
with Tasini?3  Contrary to the popular presumption, however, 
Tasini does not pronounce upon the application of standard, print 
media licensing terms to electronic uses of copyrighted material—
at least not directly.  Indeed, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
electronic media publications before it on extremely narrow 
grounds, and went to great lengths to underscore that the scope of 
the parties’ print media license agreements was not an issue before 
the Court, and therefore was not a factor in its determinations as to 
the legality of the electronic publications in question.4 
In this regard, the Tasini decision is not atypical.  Distilling 
concrete and comprehensive directives from copyright/new 
technology litigation disputes has never been easy.  Indeed, the 
development and proliferation of digital publishing technology has 
led to a number of Tasini-type copyright controversies in recent 
years, many of which have also resulted in very narrow holdings, 
limited in their application to the larger copyright questions 
presented in the digital information context.5  Interpreting and 
 
1 533 U.S. 483, 487 (2001). 
2 Cf. Robert H. Thornburg, The Presumption Against Implied Transfer of Electronic 
Rights in Licenses Under Section 201(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act: A New Right for the 
Bundle, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 235, 251 (2002) (“With the narrowing of 
limitations on what constitutes revisions . . ., publishers must replace their traditional 
handshake agreements with licenses specifically addressing electronic rights.  While 
publishers may wish to receive electronic rights currently known or later developed, 
freelance authors typically seek to grant limited rights, to take advantage of new markets 
that will develop in the future.” (citations omitted)). 
3 Cf. Mark B. Radefeld, Note, The Medium Is the Message: Copyright Law Confronts 
the Information Age in New York Times v. Tasini, 36 AKRON L. REV. 545, 577 n.177 
(2003) (noting ways in which authors and publishers have included electronic rights 
provisions in their agreements). 
4 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499–502. 
5 See generally e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (basing the denial of a preliminary injunction against the publisher of 
“e-books” on the contract language between the authors and the original publisher), aff’d, 
283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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adapting copyright canons and license terms developed in 
connection with traditional uses for copyrighted material, to 
account for revolutionary technological advances, is an inevitably 
incremental and iterative process. 
Nonetheless, close examination of the pertinent copyright and 
digital information cases reveals that the stilted progress toward a 
comprehensive digital information copyright jurisprudence is only 
partially due to the difficulties inherent in applying traditional 
copyright mechanisms and policies to technologically advanced 
uses for copyrighted works.  Much of the jurisprudential lethargy 
can also be attributed to the perennial failure of lawyers and other 
participants in the publishing trade to harmonize their licensing 
practices with the express mandates of the copyright statute. 
For example, the lack of specific—and in some instances even 
written—license terms and agreements in cases like Tasini, and the 
factually parallel Greenberg v. National Geographic Society,6 has 
germinated surrealistic interpretations of the copyright statute by 
publishers seeking to bring their unauthorized electronic 
publication activities within the law.7  Conceding that their 
endeavors were not sanctioned by their informal and ambiguous 
contractual arrangements, the publishers tried vainly to fit their 
conduct within the “safe harbor” of the obscure § 201(c) of the 
Copyright Act,8 which under very limited circumstances, allows 
publishers to republish certain kinds of copyrighted works without 
the author or copyright holder’s permission.9  Even in a case such 
as Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books, in which the rights of the 
parties were governed by specific, written license agreements,10 the 
dispositive clauses in those agreements were not cast in terms of 
the express rights provided by the copyright statute.  Instead, the 
operative terms were expressed in ambiguous publishing trade 
 
6 244 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001). 
7 Cf. Laurie A. Santelli, Comment, New Battles Between Freelance Authors and 
Publishers in the Aftermath of Tasini v. New York Times, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 253, 297–98 
(1998) (arguing that, under the copyright laws, publishers should not be able to reproduce 
freelancers’ work without their consent). 
8 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2003). 
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2003) (discussing ownership of copyrights in collective 
works). 
10 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 615–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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lingo, which required extensive judicial deciphering in resolving 
the dispute.11  Thus, efforts by the courts to apply and adapt the 
body of existing copyright jurisprudence to electronic publication 
disputes have been hampered by the failure of litigants to adhere to 
the express provisions of the copyright law in arranging and 
memorializing their copyright transactions. 
In addition to the copyright conundrums innate to rapid 
technological advancement, exacerbated by the persistently 
obstruent licensing practices in the publishing trade, there is 
another important factor that accounts for the lack of 
comprehensive progress in digital information copyright 
jurisprudence: the absence of any in-depth analysis of the fair use 
doctrine in the relevant cases.12  Given the critical public interest in 
the proliferation and use of digital technology as a whole, and in 
electronic publication and dissemination of copyrighted works in 
particular, fair use seems an appropriate course of expedition.  
Notwithstanding the vital importance of balancing the competing 
interests of authors, publishers, and the general public, however, 
there has been little exploration of fair use as a social engineering 
solution to the digital information/copyright conflict. 
Consequently, much of the current electronic publishing legal 
landscape remains an unsettled and uncertain frontier.  
Ambiguities resulting from rapid technological advance and murky 
licensing practices are unmitigated by publishers resorting to the 
heretofore unexplored (and ultimately inapplicable) § 201(c) as the 
primary digital re-publication defensive strategy.13  Admittedly, 
however, the failure to reform licensing practices and litigation 
strategies is only part of the problem.  In a much larger sense, 
electronic use and dissemination of printed copyrighted material 
 
11 See id. at 621–22. 
12 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 499–502 (2001); Greenberg, 244 F.3d 
at 1274–75; see generally Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613. 
13 Cf. Michael Landau, The Importance of Electronic Rights Revisited, GigaLaw.com, 
at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001-all/landau-2001-08-all.html (Aug. 2001) 
(“Think of all of the excerpts of magazines or newspapers that are reprinted in books with 
the legend ‘reprinted with the permission of Publisher X.’  Many of those may infringe, 
even though permission had been obtained from the magazine or newspaper in which the 
piece originally appeared, for the original publishers may not have had the right under 
201(c) to have authorized reproduction.”). 
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has yet to be independently assessed, not merely as a problem of 
authors’ rights and publishers’ interests, but as a question of the 
public interest and the principal policy objectives of the copyright 
law. 
This Article will offer a framework for the construction of a 
more progressive and cohesive copyright jurisprudence in the 
electronic publishing context, by attempting to address some of the 
principal issues surrounding unauthorized digital re-publication of 
printed copyrighted works.  Part I will briefly summarize the 
opinions in Tasini, Greenberg, and Random House, three of the 
leading decisions that involve digital re-publication disputes.  Part 
I will highlight some of the ways in which these decisions 
collectively delineate many of the salient issues regarding the 
interface between the author’s exclusive property rights under the 
copyright law and prevailing mechanisms for the commercial 
exploitation and mass dissemination of copyrighted material in the 
electronic media age. 
Part II will begin the copyright policy analysis of digital re-
publication by challenging a prevailing assumption that underlies 
digital re-publication assessment and adjudication to date: namely, 
that digital re-publication constitutes engagement in at least one or 
more of the author’s exclusive rights under the copyright law.  This 
part will propose that while it is reasonable to approach digital re-
publication as a simulation, incorporation, or combination of 
various exclusive rights, it is also reasonable to approach digital re-
publication as a wholly sui generis activity, one completely distinct 
from any of its constituent, exclusive right elements.  Accordingly, 
the determination as to what property rights copyright holders 
should have in connection with digital re-publication is one to be 
made by Congress, with appropriate consideration given to the 
concerns of all interested parties, particularly that of the general 
public. 
As an alternative to the analysis set forth in Part II, Part III will 
accept the “digital re-publication as exclusive rights” premise that 
underlies the leading decisions in this area.  Accordingly, Part III 
will attempt to lay a digital information jurisprudential framework 
from this perspective, by addressing some of the principal issues 
raised but left unresolved by these cases. 
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For example, in Tasini and Greenberg, the defendant 
publishers digitally re-published printed “collective works,” such 
as newspapers and magazines, by, inter alia, disseminating them 
through an electronic database without first obtaining permission 
from the authors of the individual articles included in these 
works.14  The ensuing litigations between the authors/copyright 
holders and their publishers ultimately centered on § 201(c), which 
grants the publisher of a collective work a special “privilege” to 
publish subsequent revisions of such works, without the 
permission of the contributing authors to the original publication.15  
Relying upon § 201(c), the publishers sought to characterize their 
digital re-publications as revisions of the original print 
publications.16 
The courts in both Tasini and Greenberg held that the digital 
re-publications were not revisions with the meaning of § 201(c).17  
There were two principal bases upon which the courts disqualified 
the digital re-publications from shelter within the special statutory 
privilege.  First, the courts found that in undertaking the digital re-
publications, the publishers made certain changes to the content of 
the contributory articles and/or to each collective work overall, 
which had the effect of rendering each digital re-publication an 
entirely new publication or independent distribution of each of its 
contributory articles, as opposed to an omnibus revision and re-
publication of the collective work as a whole.18  Second, both 
courts reasoned that such new independent distribution would have 
a devastating impact upon the commercial market for further 
publication of the individual contributory articles.19  In other 
words, the courts determined that once the contributory articles 
became electronically available, particularly online, no subsequent 
publisher was likely to pay to publish any of these articles 
elsewhere.  Each of the foregoing results was held to be 
inconsistent with the legislative purposes underlying § 201(c), and 
 
14 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488–89; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1269–71. 
15 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002). 
16 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 492; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272. 
17 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500–02; Greenberg, 244 F.3d 1275–76. 
18 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500–02; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73. 
19 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497 n.6; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1274–75. 
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therefore disqualified the digital versions of the printed collective 
works from characterization as revisions under the statute.20 
These rulings also raised but left unanswered the question of 
whether content-unaltered, print-to-digital reproductions—that is, 
full-image, exact digital replicas of printed collective works, with 
no material added or removed—can qualify as revisions under § 
201(c).  Part III will address this question, and will contend that 
full-image, exact digital replicas are also beyond the ambit of § 
201(c). 
There are at least two reasons why exact digital replicas of 
printed collective works should not be considered § 201(c) 
revisions.  First, exact digital replicas are not revisions, at least not 
in the ordinary sense of the term, in that nothing has been revised.  
Second, exact digital replicas are also outside the narrower, 
judicially construed parameters of the term revision as enunciated 
in Tasini and Greenberg.  These courts have held that the principal 
purpose of § 201(c) is to preserve the market for subsequent 
commercial exploitation of the individual contributory articles that 
compose a collective work.21  Accordingly, just as the courts found 
with respect to the content-altered, digital versions in Tasini and 
Greenberg, full-image, exact digital replicas of collective works, 
especially when dispersed into commercial online databases, 
typically will undermine this objective as well, and thereby impede 
the legislative intent underlying the statute.  Thus, Part III will 
conclude that § 201(c) is ultimately of little value in addressing the 
substantive copyright issues presented in the digital re-publication 
context. 
Part IV will explore the fair use doctrine as an alternative 
defense for unauthorized digital re-publication.  An important 
question implicated by the Tasini and Greenberg findings 
regarding the negative commercial impact of unauthorized digital 
re-publication is whether such negative impact forecloses the 
defense of fair use.  Without regard to whether the unauthorized 
digital re-publication involves full-image, exact digital replicas, or 
content-altered versions such as those at issue in Tasini and 
 
20 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505–06; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73. 
21 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73. 
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Greenberg, the availability of fair use as an alternative defense is 
implicated because the impact of an unauthorized use on the 
commercial market for the subject copyrighted work—in this case, 
each contributory article in the original collective work—is one of 
the principal factors weighed in determining whether the 
unauthorized use should be allowed as a fair use.22  Consequently, 
the Tasini and Greenberg assessments regarding negative market 
impact might seem to limit the availability of the fair use defense 
in unauthorized digital re-publication cases. 
While the findings regarding negative market impact in Tasini 
and Greenberg appear portentous, it will be argued in Part IV that 
they are not dispositive as to the availability of the fair use defense 
in digital re-publication cases.  In evaluating an unauthorized use 
under the fair use doctrine, a court is obliged to evaluate four 
separate factors, only one of which is the impact of the 
unauthorized use on the commercial market for the copyrighted 
work.23  Moreover, the purpose and significance of assessing 
market impact under § 201(c), the primary impetus for the analyses 
in Tasini and Greenberg, is not identical to that in evaluating 
market impact under the fair use doctrine.  In the context of  
§ 201(c), it is primarily the limited re-publication interests of 
commercial publishers that are pitted against the author’s exclusive 
rights and interests in reaping the benefits from the commercial 
exploitation of his or her work.24  In evaluating a claim of fair use, 
however, it is the public interest in the broadest dissemination of 
creative works that is weighed against the author’s interest in 
 
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Section 107 states: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair 
use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
Id. 
23 See id. 
24 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1275. 
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obtaining a commercial return for his or her creative endeavors.25  
Accordingly, a degree of negative market impact impermissible 
under § 201(c) might nonetheless be an acceptable impingement 
upon the author’s exclusive property rights as a matter of fair use. 
Finally, Part V will explore the significance of Tasini, 
Greenberg, Random House, and other decisions in developing 
preemptive measures toward mitigating digital re-publication and 
similar “new technological use” problems.  Each of these cases 
concerns the right of copyright holders to control electronic 
publication of their works.26  Section 106 of the Copyright Act, 
however, enumerates the specific uses of copyrighted material that 
are exclusive to, and therefore can be controlled or restricted by, 
the copyright holder.27  Section 201 sets forth the requirements for 
the effective licensing and transfer of any, or any part of, the 
copyright holder’s § 106 exclusive rights.28  Part V will contend 
that Tasini, Greenberg, and Random House provide support for the 
proposition that a license intended to authorize electronic or other 
media uses of copyrighted material should not only specify the 
subject media uses at issue, but should also satisfy §§ 106 and 201 
by identifying the specific exclusive rights appurtenant to the 
media activities being licensed.  This is because the specification 
of particular media uses alone will render the agreement 
ambiguous as to the exclusive rights involved, thereby making it 
difficult to assess the scope of the license with respect to new 
technological uses developed during its term.  By casting a 
copyright license in terms of the exclusive rights, however, 
ambiguities regarding the right to engage in a new technological 
 
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Section 107 states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A [providing authors’ 
rights in copyrighted works], the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such 
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified 
by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, 
is not an infringement of copyright. 
Id. 
26 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 491–92; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1270; Random House, Inc. 
v. Rosetta Books, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
28 See 17 U.S.C. § 201. 
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use can be resolved directly in accordance with the provisions of 
§§ 106 and/or 201, and the rights provided thereunder to copyright 
holders.29 
Part V will further contend that the judiciary can and should 
encourage this exclusive rights emphasis in the drafting and 
interpretation of copyright licenses and agreements.  One means by 
which this can be accomplished is through the application of a 
presumption of “technological neutrality” in construing an 
agreement that explicitly identifies the specific exclusive rights 
that are the subject of the license conferred.  Unless expressly 
restricted by the terms of the agreement, either through language 
specifically modifying or limiting the license of an exclusive right, 
or through the inclusion of an appropriate, general reservation of 
rights clause, an express license to engage in an exclusive right 
should be presumed to extend to any and all technological means 
available to engage in that right.  This includes such methods that 
were not in existence as of the time of the parties’ contracting, but 
have come into being during the life of the parties’ agreement. 
A presumption of technological neutrality is in accordance with 
copyright policy, which encourages the development and 
implementation of new technological uses for copyrighted 
material.  Moreover, consistent application of the presumption will 
provide greater certainty in the interpretation and enforcement of 
such contracts.  Not only will it encourage parties to express their 
publishing agreements in terms of the exclusive rights, but it will 
also provide a concrete means by which to construe such 
agreements in connection with new technological uses for 
copyrighted material. 
I.  THE TASINI, GREENBERG, AND RANDOM HOUSE DECISIONS 
Tasini,30 Greenberg,31 and Random House32 all concern the 
relationship between the copyright holder’s exclusive property 
 
29 See 17 U.S.C. § § 106, 201. 
30 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
31 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001). 
32 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
MTIMA FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:21 PM 
380 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:369 
rights under the Copyright Act and the unauthorized use of 
copyrighted material in electronic media.  The first two cases 
concern whether the unauthorized digital re-publication33 of a 
previously published collective work violates the copyrights of the 
individual contributing authors to the work or is permissible under 
the special revision privilege codified at 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).34 
A. New York Times Co. v. Tasini 
The plaintiffs in Tasini were all freelance writers who, pursuant 
to varying publishing agreements, contributed articles to several 
periodicals, including the New York Times, Newsday, and Sports 
Illustrated.35  Some time after publishing the plaintiffs’ articles as 
part of their regular print editions, the defendant publishers 
provided the content therein to LEXIS/NEXIS (“NEXIS”) for 
inclusion in its online, electronic text retrieval database.36  In 
addition, the New York Times also provided its content to 
University Microfilms International (“UMI”) in connection with 
the production of two CD-ROM products, the New York Times 
OnDisc (“NYTO CD”) and General Periodicals OnDisc (“GPO 
CD”).37 
The format in which the publishers provided their content to 
NEXIS was electronic text versions of the articles that appeared in 
their periodicals.38  The New York Times also provided such 
 
33 The term “digital re-publication” is coined herein to distinguish unauthorized 
electronic publication undertaken by, or at the behest of, the publisher of the original, 
print publication of a copyrighted work, from wholly unauthorized, third-party electronic 
publication, such as the uploading of copyrighted material onto the Internet by a private 
individual.  See generally Lateef Mtima, Trademarks, Copyrights and the Internet, in 
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 
AND THE CORPORATE COUNSEL 387 (Apr. 2003) and the cases cited therein (applying 
traditional intellectual property concepts, including re-publication and fair use, to the 
Internet). 
34 Random House does not involve interpretation of § 201(c), but rather concerns the 
interpretation of standard, print media licensing terms in connection with digital re-
publication. See infra Part I.C. 
35 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488–89. 
36 See id. at 489–90. 
37 See id. at 490. 
38 See id. at 489. 
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material to UMI, for use in compiling the NYTO CD.39  Content 
such as captions, headlines, and graphics, as well as the actual 
publication layout such as text columns, was not included in the 
electronic versions provided to NEXIS and UMI, and 
consequently, was not reproduced in the NEXIS database or on the 
NYTO CD.40 
Using either NEXIS or the NYTO CD, a user could review the 
entire electronic periodical content, or could retrieve the electronic 
text of individual articles or of a group of individual articles in 
response to an appropriate search.41  On the other hand, because 
material such as photographs and column layouts had been deleted 
from the electronic versions of the periodical content, the user 
would not be able to review entire periodicals, or any of their 
individual articles as they appeared in the original printed versions 
of the collective works.42 
The GPO CD, unlike the NEXIS database or the NYTO CD, 
was an image-based product, which means that it contained full-
image, exact digital reproductions of the New York Times Book 
Review and the New York Times Sunday Magazine.43  Accordingly, 
the GPO CD reproduced both the New York Times Book Review 
and the New York Times Sunday Magazine as each originally 
appeared in hard copy.44  In addition, full-image, exact digital 
reproductions of other periodicals were also included on the GPO 
CD.45  Finally, just as with the NEXIS database and the NYTO 
CD, when using the GPO CD a single article could be individually 
retrieved, or retrieved as part of a group of articles, in response to a 
search.46 
 
39 See id. at 490–91. 
40 See id. at 490. 
41 See id. at 490–91, 499–501. 
42 See id. at 490. 
43 See id. at 491. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. at 491, 499–501. 
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1. The Dispute Over the Use of the Freelance Writers’ 
Contributory Articles 
The freelance writers argued that their agreements with the 
publishers did not grant the publishers the right to publish the 
authors’ works in electronic media formats, such as by including 
the works in the foregoing databases and CD products.47  The 
writers claimed that the electronic publications were unauthorized 
and therefore violated several of their exclusive rights under the 
copyright law.48 
The publishers countered that, inter alia, because the works at 
issue were collective works, they did not need the freelance 
writers’ permission to re-publish them in electronic form.49  The 
publishers relied upon § 201(c) of the Copyright Act, which 
permits publishers of collective works to publish revisions of such 
works, without the permission of the individual contributing 
authors: 
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work 
is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, 
and [this distinct copyright] vests initially in the author of 
the contribution.  In the absence of an express transfer of 
[this distinct] copyright . . . the owner of copyright in the 
collective work is presumed to have acquired only the 
privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as 
part of that particular collective work, any revision of that 
collective work, and any later collective work in the same 
series.50 
Thus, the central issue in dispute became whether the 
electronic re-publications constituted revisions within the special 
statutory privilege.51 
 
47 See id. at 491–92. 
48 The copyright holder’s exclusive rights are enumerated at 17 U.S.C. § 106.  Among 
the exclusive rights at issue in Tasini were the rights of reproduction, distribution, and 
public display. See infra Part II. 
49 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499. 
50 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002). 
51 Both sides advanced several additional arguments in the lower court which were not 
pressed before or ruled upon by the Supreme Court.  The freelance writers argued that 
even if the electronic publications fit within § 201(c), the publishers could not transfer 
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2. Are Digital Re-Publications § 201(c) Revisions? 
The freelance writers in Tasini challenged the publishers’ 
characterization of the digital re-publications as revisions with an 
interpretation of the legislative intent underlying § 201.52  
According to the writers, Congress’ primary purpose in passing  
§ 201(c) was to abolish the doctrine of indivisibility.53  Under that 
doctrine, once a contributory work was published as part of a 
collective work, unless the publisher took affirmative steps to 
secure a separate copyright for the author of the contribution, the 
publisher obtained the sole copyright, both with respect to the 
collective work as a whole and the individual contributory works 
that composed the collective work.54 
The freelance writers contended that Congress passed § 201(c) 
in order to restore to authors the individual copyrights in their 
 
their re-publication privilege to third-parties such as NEXIS and UMI. See Tasini v. N.Y. 
Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d and remanded, 206 F.3d 161 
(2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).  The writers further argued that even if the 
privilege is transferable to third parties, it is limited to reproduction and distribution, and 
does not include any privilege to display the individual articles, such as on a computer 
screen. See id. at 816–18.  As for the publishers, some of them did contend that the terms 
of their license agreements extended to electronic publication. See id. at 810–12. 
52 See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 809. 
53 See id. at 815; 3-10 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, §§ 10.01, 10.02 (2002) (“Because the 1909 Act spoke of a single ‘copyright’ 
to which the author of a work was entitled, and referred in the singular to ‘the copyright 
proprietor,’ it was inferred that the bundle of rights which accrued to a copyright owner 
were ‘indivisible,’ that is, incapable of assignment in parts.  This notion, which found its 
historical roots in an early English copyright case and an American patent case, when 
literally followed renders it impossible to ‘assign’ anything less than the totality of rights 
commanded by copyright.” (footnotes omitted)). 
54 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 494–95 (“Prior to the 1976 revision, . . . 
authors risked losing their rights when they placed an article in a collective work.  Pre-
1976 copyright law recognized a freelance author’s copyright in a published article only 
when the article was printed with a copyright notice in the author’s name.  When 
publishers, exercising their superior bargaining power over authors, declined to print 
notices in each contributor’s name, the author’s copyright was put in jeopardy. . . . Thus, 
when a copyright notice appeared only in the publisher’s name, the author’s work would 
fall into the public domain . . . [o]r . . . a court might find that an author had tacitly 
transferred the entire copyright to the publisher . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 386 (1994); NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 53, §§ 10.01 [C][2], 10.02. 
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contributions to collective works.55  Consequently, § 201(c) 
preserves the contributing authors’ options with respect to further 
publication of their works, beyond their authorization of the initial 
publication in the collective work.56  At the same time, however,  
§ 201(c) permits publishers to retain their autonomy in updating 
their collective works as a whole, granting them the “privilege” to 
publish appropriate revisions thereof, without having to obtain the 
 
55 Specifically, 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) provides that the copyright to a contributory work 
resides in the contributing author, whereas the publisher obtains the copyright in the 
collective work as a whole. See, e.g., James T. Ota, New York Times Co. v. Tasini: Can 
Electronic Publications Ever Be Considered Revisions of Print Media?, 24 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 843, 846 (2002) (“[U]nder 17 U.S.C. § 201, there are two copyrights vested in 
[collective work] publications.  The first copyright exists in the individual articles 
themselves and usually vests in the original author of the work.  The second copyright 
exists in the publication as a whole and protects the publisher’s original expression in 
selecting, coordinating, or arranging such articles to create the collective work.” (citations 
omitted)). 
56 See Christine Soares, Freelance Articles and Electronic Databases: Who Owns the 
Copyrights?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0025 ¶ 9 (2001) (“The 1976 version of the 
[Copyright] Act eliminated the notion of an indivisible copyright.  Subsequently, separate 
copyrights could be maintained for both the individual article and the collective work.  
The author retained the copyright over the article, while the publisher maintained the 
copyright for the collective work as well as a revision privilege detailed in §201(c) of the 
statute.” (citations omitted)); Michael A. Albert & Ilan N. Barzilay, Copyright 
Developments Affect Electronic Rights, 46 BOSTON B.J. 16  (Jan./Feb. 2002) (“In 1976, 
Congress abolished the doctrine of copyright ‘indivisibility,’ providing instead that the 
copyright owner’s bundle of exclusive rights ‘may be transferred . . . and owned 
separately.’  Rights to an individual article in a collective work (reserved to the author) 
were separated from rights to the article in the context of the collective work (reserved to 
the publisher).” (citations omitted)); James K. Reed, Securing Electronic Rights in a 
Post-Tasini World, in 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW, at 1080–81 (PLI 
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Handbook Series No. G0-00VJ, 
2002) (“In the 1976 overhaul of the Copyright Act, Congress replaced the Doctrine of 
Indivisibility with greater protections for writers.  Specifically, Congress separated the 
copyright in the individual contribution and the copyright in the collective work.  The 
contributed work and the collective work were now considered two different works, the 
author of the contributed work remained the copyright owner of the contributed work and 
the magazine publisher remained the copyright owner of the collective work.  In addition, 
Congress gave the publishers the ‘privilege’ to use the contributed work (a) as part of the 
collective work, (b) in revisions of the collective work, and (c) in any later collective 
work in the same series.” (citation omitted)); JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., COPYRIGHT LAW IN 
BUSINESS AND PRACTICE § 4:23 (cumulative Supp. No. 1 2003). 
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permission of each and every individual contributing author 
thereto.57 
Both the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed 
with the freelance writers that Congress’ primary objective in 
revising § 201 was to benefit authors by abolishing the doctrine of 
indivisibility.58  The two courts differed, however, as to the 
application of the legislative imperative to the facts of the case. 
The district court reasoned that the publisher’s collective work 
copyright and its concomitant revision privilege are both 
substantively grounded in the publisher’s creative editorial 
contribution in arranging the collective work as a whole.59  Thus, 
although the publisher is not permitted to use the contributory 
works in an entirely new collective work publication,60 the district 
court held that § 201(c) authorizes their use in a subsequent 
revision that reflects the publisher’s creative editorial contributions 
in arranging the original work.61  Finding that the electronic 
 
57 See Albert & Barzilay, supra note 56, at 16 (“Publishers could thus reprint, revise or 
transfer their publications to different media, or archive them in bound volumes or 
microfilm; and these ‘revisions’ would not infringe the copyrights belonging to the author 
of each included article.  Publishers did not have to negotiate separately with each author 
in order to be able to archive or reprint the entire collective work.”). 
58 See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 819–20 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d and 
remanded, 206 F.3d 161, 167–68 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
59 See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 820–21 (“In other words, the creators of collective works 
are entitled to rights in [the contributory] works only to the extent that they have 
demonstrated creativity in selecting and arranging preexisting materials into an original 
collective whole.  It is this original contribution which gives a collective work its unique 
character, i.e., which makes it identifiable as ‘that collective work.’” (citation omitted)). 
60 See id. at 821 (“Defendants are not permitted to place plaintiffs’ articles into ‘new 
anthologies’ or ‘entirely different magazine[s] or other collective work[s],’ but only into 
revisions of those collective works in which plaintiffs’ articles first appeared.  If 
defendants change the original selection and arrangement of their newspapers or 
magazines, however, they are at risk of creating new works, works no longer 
recognizable as versions of the periodicals that are the source of their rights.  Thus, in 
whatever ways they change their collective works, defendants must preserve some 
significant original aspect of those works . . . if they expect to satisfy the requirements of 
[§] 201(c).” (citation omitted)). 
61 See id. at 820 (“Although the ‘any revision’ language of [§] 201(c) is broad, a new 
work must be recognizable as a version of a preexisting collective work if it is to be fairly 
characterized a revision of ‘that collective work.’ . . . [C]ollective works, even to the 
extent that they consist entirely of individual original contributions, possess 
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publications in fact retained this contribution in that, inter alia, 
they continued to reflect the publishers’ initial decision to select 
these specific articles for inclusion in the original work, the district 
court concluded that the digital re-publications constituted 
revisions within the meaning of § 201(c).62 
The Court of Appeals, however, did not agree that the 
electronic publications sufficiently reflected the publishers’ 
original editorial contributions so as to qualify as revisions of the 
original collective works.  Instead, the Court of Appeals 
emphasized the fact that in the electronic transfer of the 
periodicals’ content “a substantial portion of what appears in that 
particular [collective work] is not made part of [the] file 
transmitted . . . including . . . formatting decisions, pictures, maps 
and tables, and obituaries.”63  The court found that the deletion of 
this material diluted the publisher’s original editorial contribution 
to the point that it was no longer sufficiently recognizable in the 
final electronic products.64 
Moreover, the court also noted that in the digital formats, the 
authors’ contributions could be retrieved individually, just as if the 
individual articles had been sold or licensed one at a time, then 
combined with the contents of other collective works, and finally, 
compiled into an entirely new work.65  The individual re-
distribution of contributory works, or the use of such works in new 
collective works are beyond the § 201(c) privilege and 
accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the court held that the 
 
distinguishing original characteristics of their own—i.e., they are greater than the sum of 
their parts.  It is therefore possible to revise a collective work by changing the original 
whole of that work without altering the content of the individual contributions to that 
work.” (citations omitted)). 
62 See id. at 821–24.  As such, the court concluded that the digital re-publications did 
not deprive the freelance writers of any secondary publication market which Congress 
had intended them to have. See id. at 826–28.  The court also concluded that the 
publisher’s privilege to publish revisions is not only transferable to third parties, but that 
it includes the right to display the collective work and any revision thereof. See id. at 
815–17. 
63 Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 206 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 1999). 
64 See id. at 168–69. 
65 See id. at 169–70. 
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unauthorized digital re-publications infringed upon the authors’ 
copyrights.66 
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Supreme Court agreed with both lower courts that the 
1976 revision of § 201 was primarily intended to benefit authors 
by disposing of the doctrine of indivisibility.67  Consequently, 
authors of contributions to collective works are free to exploit their 
works in subsequent venues, and the publisher of the collective 
work has no right to make any further use of such contributory 
works, other than its “privilege” to publish a revision of the entire 
collective work in accordance with § 201(c).68 
In deciding whether the electronic publications in fact 
constituted revisions within the meaning of § 201(c), however, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit that in the subject 
digital formats, the collective works were effectively disassembled 
into new and independent publications of the contributory articles 
that made up the original collective works: 
In agreement with the Second Circuit, we hold that  
§ 201(c) does not authorize the copying at issue here.  The 
publishers are not sheltered by § 201(c), we conclude, 
because the databases reproduce and distribute articles 
standing alone and not in context, not ‘as part of that 
particular collective work’ to which the author contributed, 
 
66 See id. 
67 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 (2001).  The Court held that in 
passing § 201, Congress intended to clarify that the publisher’s copyright in a collective 
work is limited to the collective work as a whole, and is based upon the editorial 
selection, arrangement, and layout of the work. See id. at 495–96.  Revised § 201(c) 
enables the author contributing to the collective work to retain his or her copyright in his 
or her own creative contribution—that is, his or her individual article. See id.  But see 
Andrew Snyder, Comment, Pulling the Plug: Ignoring the Rights of the Public in 
Interpreting Copyright Law, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 365, 374–75 (2002) (“The majority 
failed to recognize the intent of the authors and publishers (and Congress) with regard to 
201(c).  This important consideration shows authors were concerned about the possibility 
of publishers altering the content of articles, and not about how or where the articles were 
displayed. . . . Thus, at the time of the statute’s creation, the conflict surrounding 201(c) 
dealt with changing the content, not with altering the presentation of text in different 
formats.” (citations omitted)). 
68 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 496–97. 
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‘as part of . . . any revision’ thereof, or ‘as part of . . . any 
later collective work in the same series.’  Both the print 
publishers and the electronic publishers, we rule, have 
infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors.69 
Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that to allow the digital 
re-publications as privileged revisions would defeat the legislative 
objective underlying § 20l(c).70  In effect, the Court found that the 
development of digital technology has resulted in the creation of a 
secondary, “stand-alone” market for the individual contributions to 
collective works and construed that Congress intended that the 
contributory authors, as opposed to the publishers, be the ones to 
benefit from such new markets.71  Given the nature of the 
electronic products at issue, the Court found that there is no 
 
69 Id. at 488; see also Soares, supra note 56, ¶ 15 nn.41–42 (“[T]he Court determined 
that the search-and-retrieve method of accessing the articles in the databases made it 
impossible to consider the databases as revisions of the original periodicals.  The majority 
viewed the databases either as new collective works or simply as a means by which 
individual articles could be retrieved.” (citations omitted)). 
70 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497 n.6 (“In years past, books compiling stories by journalists 
such as Janet Flanner and Ernie Pyle might have sold less well had the individual articles 
been freely and permanently available on line.  In the present, print collections of 
reviews, commentaries, and reportage may prove less popular because of the Databases.  
The Register of Copyrights reports that ‘freelance authors have experienced significant 
economic loss’ due to a ‘digital revolution that has given publishers [new] opportunities 
to exploit authors’ works.’”); see also Alicia Morris Groos, Developments in U.S. 
Copyright Law 2000–2001: From Revising the Old South to Redefining the Digital 
Millennium, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 130 (2001) (“With the evolution of digital 
technology, the Internet, and massive searchable databases such as NEXIS and 
WESTLAW, selling and marketing individual stand-alone copies of articles on a wide 
scale became economically feasible for the first time.  For a fee, publishers license copies 
of their collective works (containing individual articles) to these databases, and the 
database publishers then allow their paying users to search for, retrieve, download, and 
print copies of the individual articles.  The copyright owner of the individual work is left 
out of the equation, except for facing a ‘shrunken market for secondary sales of their 
works.’” (citation omitted)). 
71 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497.  Although the district court differed on the issue of who 
should benefit from such new markets, all three courts seem to assume the existence of 
secondary, “stand alone” digital re-publication markets for individual contributory works. 
See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 826 (“The [district] [c]ourt does not take 
lightly that its holding deprives plaintiffs of certain important economic benefits 
associated with their creations.”), rev’d and remanded, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), 
aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).  A reasonable argument can be made, however, challenging 
whether such secondary markets actually exist. See infra Part IV. 
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practical difference between licensing the contributions to a 
database individually or as a part of the collective work as a 
whole,72 and thus the secondary, “stand-alone” re-publication 
market that § 201(c) restores to individual contributing authors had 
been usurped by the publishers.73  Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that the digital re-publications were not revisions within 
the meaning of § 201(c), but rather constituted new publications of 
the contributory works beyond the statutory privilege.74 
 
72 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499–500 (“[T]he three Databases present articles to users 
clear of the content provided either by the original periodical editions or by any revision 
of those editions.  The Databases first prompt users to search the universe of their 
contents: thousands or millions of files containing individual articles from thousands of 
collective works . . ., either in one series (the Times, in NYTO) or in scores of series (the 
sundry titles in NEXIS and GPO).  When the user conducts a search, each article appears 
as a separate item within the search result. . . . In either circumstance, we cannot see how 
the Database perceptively reproduces and distributes the article ‘as part of’ either the 
original edition or a ‘revision’ of that edition.”). 
73 See id. at 497 (“Essentially, § 201(c) adjusts a publisher’s copyright in its collective 
work to accommodate a freelancer’s copyright in her contribution. . . . It would scarcely 
‘preserve the author’s copyright in a contribution’ as contemplated by Congress if a 
newspaper or magazine publisher were permitted to reproduce or distribute copies of the 
author’s contribution in isolation or within new collective works.” (citations omitted)). 
74 Citing the doctrine of media neutrality, Justice Stevens vigorously challenged this 
conclusion in his dissenting opinion. See id. at 512–15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  As 
Justice Stevens argued, the attributes of independent retrieval are characteristics inherent 
to digital media, and to disqualify the digital re-publications as revisions on that basis is 
to discriminate against electronic media in favor of print media. Cf. 1 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND 
ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 20.2, at 94 (1976) (“[T]he mere 
reproduction of a work of art in a different medium should not constitute the required 
originality, for the reason that no one can claim to have independently evolved any 
particular medium.”); CRC Press, LLC v. Wolfram Research, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 500, 
509-10 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (“Changing the medium in which a copyrightable work is 
displayed is not a sufficient change to give rise to a derivative work. . . . By moving the 
content of [a copyrightable] website to [a written encyclopedia], . . . [p]laintiff could not 
have created a copyrightable derivative work.” (citations omitted)); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. 
v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976).  Justice Stevens’ arguments are particularly 
convincing with respect to the disqualification of The New York Times’ full-image GPO 
CD.  While the removal of photographs, captions, and graphics in connection with the 
other digital re-publications contributed to their characterization as entirely new and 
independent publications, the only differences between the GPO CD and the original 
print versions is that the GPO CD is Boolean searchable and combines previously 
independent editions with other periodicals on a single CD.  Arguably, the majority 
eschewed a direct conflict with the doctrine of media neutrality, because the compilation 
of originally independent editions onto a single disc is not a feature “inherent” to digital 
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Finally, the Supreme Court noted that the defendants offered 
no other arguments in defense of their electronic activities.75 
Against the Authors’ charge of infringement, the Publishers do 
not here contend the Authors entered into an agreement 
authorizing reproduction of the Articles in the Databases.  Nor do 
they assert that the copies in the Databases represent “fair use” of 
the Authors’ Articles.  Instead, the Publishers rest entirely on the 
privilege described in § 201(c).76 
In the absence of any claim of license to engage in the digital 
re-publications, or the assertion of a copyright defense such as fair 
use,77 once the Court found § 201(c) inapplicable, it held that the 
unauthorized publications were undertaken in violation of the 
authors’ contributory work copyrights.78 
B. Greenberg v. National Geographic Society 
A publisher’s use of a printed contributory work in a 
subsequent digital re-publication was also the basis for litigation in 
Greenberg v. National Geographic Society.79  In Greenberg, the 
freelance photographer of a copyrighted photograph brought suit 
 
media.  As discussed in Part II, however, if the GPO CDs were limited to a single edition 
per disc, Justice Stevens’ argument seems inescapably cogent. 
75 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499. 
76 Id.  Although Newsday and Time had contended before the district court that their 
publishing agreements with the freelance writers actually authorized electronic 
publication, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals had disposed of Time’s 
argument on the merits, and had further ruled that Newsday had ultimately waived this 
defense. See id. at 489 n.1.  Neither defendant renewed these arguments before the 
Supreme Court, nor did any of the publishers seek to defend the electronic publications 
on any grounds other than the assertion of their privilege to undertake revisions under § 
201(c). See id. 
77 As discussed in Part III, the publishers may have had a viable fair use defense. 
78 See id. at 506. 
79 Another important case in which the defendant sought to rely upon § 201(c) in 
defense of an unauthorized use of previously published copyrighted works is Ryan v. 
CARL Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1998). However, that case does not actually 
involve digital re-publication, in that the defendant was not the publisher of the subject 
works, but rather, provided something like a document delivery service. See id. at 1147.  
Defendant maintained a database comprising the titles of published articles, and once a 
user/client indicated a selection therefrom, defendant would physically visit a library that 
contained a copy of the article, photocopy it, and then send a copy to the user/client. See 
id. 
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against his publisher, the National Geographic Society (“National 
Geographic”), when National Geographic re-used his photograph 
in the production of an image-based, CD-ROM replica of all 1,200 
back issues of National Geographic Magazine (“NG-CD”).80  In 
addition to the exact digital reproduction of the back issues 
(“Replica”), the NG-CD also contained an opening animation 
sequence (“Animation Sequence”), which had been constructed 
from photographs that had appeared on various covers of the 
magazine, including plaintiff Greenberg’s photograph.81  Finally, 
the NG-CD also contained a software program that enabled, inter 
alia, retrieval of independent back issues and/or the individual 
articles from within each back issue.82 
Just as the defendant publishers in Tasini, National Geographic 
relied upon § 201(c) in defense of its digital re-publication, 
contending that the NG-CD was merely a revision of its entire 
archive of collective work back issues.83  The Eleventh Circuit 
concluded, however, that the use of the contributory work in the 
Animation Sequence went well beyond any reasonable definition 
of the term revision: 
The Society argues that its use . . . constitutes a “revision” 
of [its] “. . . collective work”, referring to the [NG-CD] as 
the compendium of over 1,200 independent back 
issues . . . . Assuming arguendo, but expressly not 
deciding, that 201(c)’s revision privilege embraces the 
 
80 See Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(“What the user of the [NG-CD] sees on his computer screen, . . . is a reproduction of 
each page of the Magazine that differs from the original only in the size and resolution of 
the photographs and text.  Every cover, article, advertisement, and photograph appears as 
it did in the original paper copy of the Magazine.  The user can print out the image of any 
page of the Magazine, but the [NG-CD] does not provide a means for the user to separate 
the photographs from the text or otherwise to edit the pages in any way.”). 
81 See id. (“The Sequence is an animated clip that plays automatically when any disc 
from the [NG-CD] library is activated.  The clip begins with the image of an actual cover 
of a past issue of the Magazine.  This image, through the use of computer animation, 
overlappingly fades . . . into the image of another cover . . . and then morphs into another 
cover image, and so on, until 10 different covers have been displayed. . . . The entire 
sequence lasts for 25 seconds, and is accompanied by music and sound effects.”). 
82 See id. 
83 See id. at 1271–72.  National Geographic also pursued a fair use defense, the 
disposition of which is discussed in Part IV. 
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entirety of the [reproduced 1,200 back issues], we are 
unable to stretch the phrase “that particular collective 
work” to encompass the [Animated] Sequence and [the 
software] Program elements as well.84 
The court concluded that the Animation Sequence was an 
entirely new work, independent of the printed collective work in 
which Greenberg’s photograph had originally appeared.85 
In layman’s terms, the instant product is in no sense a 
“revision.”  In this case we do not need to consult 
dictionaries or colloquial meanings to understand what is 
permitted under § 201(c). 
. . . . 
. . . [C]ommon-sense copyright analysis compels the 
conclusion that [National Geographic] . . . has created a 
new product (“an original work of authorship”), in a new 
medium, for a new market that far transcends any privilege 
of revision or other mere reproduction envisioned in  
§ 201(c).86 
C. Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books 
Unlike the Tasini and Greenberg cases, Random House, Inc. v. 
Rosetta Books did not involve the § 201(c) revision privilege in as 
much as that dispute did not involve collective works.87  Rather, 
the extent to which publishing and licensing terms, which had been 
drafted in contemplation of print publication, could be 
subsequently construed to authorize electronic publication was the 
principal issue in controversy.88  Ironically, however, the plaintiff 
publisher in this case was not seeking to deploy its publishing 
license in order to undertake electronic publication, but rather to 
enjoin it.89 
 
84 Id. at 1272. 
85 See id. at 1272–73. 
86 Id. 
87 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 613–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
88 See id. at 617–18. 
89 See id. at 614. 
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In Random House, three well-known authors—William Styron, 
Kurt Vonnegut, and Robert B. Parker—had each entered into 
separate agreements with Random House to publish certain of their 
works.90  While the terms of the individual agreements differed in 
various respects, each agreement granted Random House the 
exclusive right to “print, publish and sell the work in book form.”91 
In 2000 and 2001, each of the authors entered into separate 
agreements with the defendant Rosetta Books, permitting Rosetta 
to publish certain of their works as “e-books.”92  These works were 
also the subject of the authors’ prior individual agreements with 
Random House.93  Upon learning of the Rosetta agreements, 
Random House commenced litigation alleging, inter alia, 
copyright infringement and sought to enjoin publication of the e-
books.94  Random House contended that the publication of the e-
books would infringe upon the grants of copyrights that it had 
previously obtained under its agreements with each of the 
authors.95  In short, Random House took the position that its right 
“to publish in book form” encompassed the right to publish the 
works in electronic book form, and consequently, the Rosetta 
agreements infringed upon the copyrights that Random House had 
already obtained from the authors.96 
 
90 The Styron agreement was entered into in 1961, the Vonnegut agreement in 1967, 
and the Parker agreement in 1982. See id. at 615–16. 
91 Id. at 615. 
92 See id. at 614–15 (“Ebooks are ‘digital books[s] that you can read on a computer 
screen or an electronic device.’  Ebooks are created by converting digitized text into a 
format readable by computer software.  The text can be viewed on a desktop or laptop 
computer, personal digital assistant or handheld dedicated ebook reading device. . . . 
Although the text of the ebook is exactly the same as the text of the original work, the 
ebook contains various features that take advantage of its digital format.  For example, 
ebook users can search the work electronically to find specific words and phrases.  They 
can electronically ‘highlight’ and ‘bookmark’ certain text, which can then be 
automatically indexed and accessed through hyperlinks.  They can use hyperlinks in the 
table of contents to jump to specific chapters. . . . In addition, users can have displayed 
the definition of any word in the text.  In one version of the software, the word can be 
pronounced aloud.” (citations omitted)); see also Nancy B. Vermylen, Book Publishing in 
the Age of the E-Book, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 190, 193 (2002) (explaining various 
versions of e-books and readers available). 
93 See Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 615–17. 
94 See id. at 614. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 620–21. 
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In interpreting the prior agreements between Random House 
and each of the individual authors—some of which were executed 
more than forty years prior to the Rosetta agreements—the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the 
contracts simply did not contemplate electronic publication.97  
Although the court readily acknowledged that it was possible for a 
copyright holder to license the right to use his or her work through 
technological means not in existence as of the time of the parties’ 
contracting,98 the court found that the express language of the 
parties’ agreement indicated that the Random House license did 
not extend to the new technological application of e-books: 
[T]his [c]ourt finds that the most reasonable interpretation 
of the grant in the contracts at issue to “print, publish and 
sell the work in book form” does not include the right to 
publish the work as an ebook. . . .  The Random House 
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines a “book” as “a 
written or printed work of fiction or nonfiction, usually on 
sheets of paper fastened or bound together within 
covers” . . . . 
[Moreover, in the contract] separate grant language is used 
to convey the rights to publish book club editions, reprint 
editions, abridged forms, and editions in Braille.  This 
language would not be necessary if the phrase “in book 
form” encompassed all types of books.99 
Accordingly, the court’s decision did not turn upon a 
determination as to which of the authors’ exclusive rights under the 
copyright law had been assigned to Random House as part of the 
overall grant of the right “to print, publish and sell.”100  Instead, 
disposition of the dispute turned upon interpretation of the 
 
97 See id. at 621–22 (holding that “in book form” does not apply to e-books). 
98 See id. at 619; see also generally Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt 
Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[I]f the broad terms of the license are 
more reasonably read to include the particular future technology in question, then the 
licensee may rely on that language.”); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 
150 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that the agreement at issue covered the “new use” of 
converting the copyrighted motion picture for television use). 
99 Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
100 See id. 
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publishing trade term “in book form.”101  Once the court found that 
an e-book does not constitute the production of a printed work “in 
book form,” the grant of rights under the Rosetta agreements 
became distinct from the grant of rights under the Random House 
license, and there was no basis for plaintiff’s infringement 
claim.102 
D. The Right of Digital Re-Publication: To Whom Does It 
Belong? 
Tasini, Greenberg, and Random House each involve the 
problem of determining who has the right to re-publish printed 
copyrighted material in electronic formats.103  Although the parties 
and even the courts in each of these cases apparently presumed that 
right belongs at least initially to the copyright holder, as one might 
expect, the copyright statute does not expressly refer to such a right 
in its enumeration of an author’s exclusive property rights, much 
less designate to whom such a right belongs.  In order to 
understand the basis for the presumption that the digital re-
publication right belongs to the copyright holder—and more 
importantly, to test the validity of that presumption—it is 
necessary to review briefly the scheme of rights provided for under 
the copyright law. 
 
101 Although it is easy to perceive how that phrase could be understood to mean “the 
production of anything that resembles a book,” in the publishing trade, “in book form” 
has generally been construed to encompass only conventional books.  Consequently 
publications such as comic books have been excluded from the definition. See, e.g., Field 
v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); NIMMER, supra note 53, § 
10.14 [C].  As discussed previously, reconciling publishing trade terminology with the 
express provisions of the copyright statute, regardless of whether any new technological 
use is involved, is the basis for much publishing license litigation. 
102 See Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 624; see also CRC Press, LLC v. Wolfram 
Research, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 500, 506–10 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (discussing whether 
language assigning all rights to a work includes an assignment of the right to undertake 
derivative works). 
103 See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Greenberg v. Nat’l 
Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001); Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613. 
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II.  DIGITAL RE-PUBLICATION AND THE COPYRIGHT LAW 
Congressional authority to enact a copyright law is expressly 
provided for in the Constitution.104  Pursuant to article I, Congress 
has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries . . . .”105  In accordance with this constitutional 
mandate, both Congress and the courts have determined that the 
“overarching object of copyright law in the United States is to 
encourage the widest possible production and dissemination of 
literary and artistic works.”106  Through widespread production and 
 
104 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
105 Id.; see also Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for 
Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 581 (1985) (“Congress has interpreted the 
term ‘writings’ generously when fulfilling its constitutional mandate.  The first copyright 
statute, of 1790, listed maps and charts ahead of books in its short list of protected 
‘writings.’  In the 1976 thorough revision of copyright law, the constitutional protection 
of ‘writings’ became a protection that ‘subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid 
of a machine or device.’  This language insures that copyright is receptive to new 
technologies, provided that fixation and communication are possible.” (citations 
omitted)); Jason S. Rooks, Note, Constitutionality of Judicially-Imposed Compulsory 
Licenses in Copyright Infringement Cases, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 257 (1995) 
(detailing the derivation of American copyright law from Great Britain’s Statute of Anne, 
and discussing the establishment of a public domain in creative works). 
106 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.14 (2d ed. 2002); see also Marci A. Hamilton, 
Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of Deference, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 317, 319 (2000) (“Elements of the [Supreme C]ourt’s . . . interpretation of the 
Copyright Clause . . . includ[e] an emphasis on the public good that forces author’s rights 
to be conditioned by the public. . . . From the first case, through the present, the Court has 
treated copyright law as positive law, the parameters of which are determined by 
Congress ([as] limited by the Constitution’s strictures).”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair 
Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990) (“The Supreme Court has often and 
consistently summarized the objectives of copyright law.  The copyright is not an 
inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers on authors the absolute ownership of their 
creations.  It is designed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the 
intellectual enrichment of the public.”); Rooks, supra note 105, at 259 (“The Supreme 
Court . . . has made clear that . . . copyright exists primarily to serve the public interest; 
authors’ and publishers’ interests are therefore secondary.”). But see Alfred C. Yen, 
Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright As Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 
531 (1990) (“Even though economics became the ostensibly sole basis of copyright, 
modern copyright somehow evolved along lines similar to those suggested by the natural 
law.  This can be seen most clearly by outlining the basic copyright doctrines of 
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dissemination, the greatest amount of creative works are likely to 
reach the largest audience, who will not only benefit from 
exposure to these works, but who will in turn build upon the ideas 
advanced therein and produce additional works.  Thus, the 
progress of the arts and sciences is furthered and assured to the 
greater societal good.107 
In order to achieve such widespread dissemination of creative 
works, however, there must first be an abundant supply of creative 
works to disseminate.108  Consequently, creative artists must have 
proper incentive to produce these works.109  As set forth in article 
I, Congress may provide such incentive by granting authors the 
 
originality and the idea/expression dichotomy and then comparing them to the natural law 
of property through labor and possession . . . . [M]odern American copyright appears to 
vindicate an author’s right to property in the fruits of her labor, but subject to the limits of 
what can be feasibly possessed.”). 
107 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1992); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 
342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Leval, supra note 106, at 1126 (“Copyright 
seeks to maximize the creation and publication of socially useful material. . . . Copyright 
is not a reward for goodness but a protection for the profits of activity that is useful to the 
public education.”); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and “The Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41–42 (1993) (“One’s conclusion as to the nature of copyright is 
determined by one’s view of its source.  A coherent and consistent view of copyright 
requires that the source be Congress, which can grant the author only the right to publish 
and vend, with only such extensions as do not subordinate constitutional policies to the 
cause of private profit.  The point is that copyright law is more regulatory than 
proprietary in nature, for only the regulatory concept makes any sense in view of the 
three policies that the Copyright Clause mandates: promotion of learning, protection of 
the public domain, and benefit to the author.”). 
108 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
109 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 299, 
330 (1988) (“Locke offers a positive justification for property that buttresses his labor 
theory.  He suggests that granting people property rights in goods procured through their 
labor ‘increase[s] the common stock of mankind,’ a utilitarian argument grounded in 
increasing mankind’s collective wealth. . . . Like [Locke’s] labor theory, [Hegel’s] 
personality theory has intuitive appeal when applied to intellectual property: an idea 
belongs to its creator because the idea is a manifestation of the creator’s personality or 
self.”); Scott L. Bach, Note, Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory Licenses: 
Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 396–97 (1986) (“The 
framers of the Constitution concluded that the most effective way to encourage creative 
expression is to give exclusive rights to authors for a period of limited duration.  Such 
rights, however, are not Constitutionally guaranteed, but are created in Congress’s 
discretion.” (citations omitted)). 
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“exclusive right” to their works.110  By securing to authors 
property rights in connection with their works, the copyright law 
provides a means by which authors might profit financially from 
their efforts and thereby provides them with the necessary 
inducement to undertake and continue their creative labors.111 
The specific mechanism through which the Copyright Act 
provides an author with exclusive property rights might seem 
complex at first, but it is actually relatively straightforward.  Under 
the copyright law, the uses to which a copyrighted work might be 
put—such as reading a book, distributing a photograph for sale, or 
performing a musical composition—are divided into two 
categories.  The first category is comprised of a list of specific uses 
that are designated as exclusive to authors and are referred to as the 
 
110 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) 
(“‘The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents 
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain 
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
“Science and useful Arts.”‘“ (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))); see 
generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 1.14; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 
8.01[A]; Bach, supra note 109, at 383 (“The limited monopoly policy of copyright law 
arises from . . . the Constitution . . . . Underlying the [copyright clause] is the principle 
that society will be harmed if artists are not given exclusive rights to exploit their works 
for a limited time, because the lack of such rights would discourage artistic creativity.  
Thus, granting a limited monopoly in copyright advances the public interest because it 
encourages artists to create through the prospect of financial gain.  The eventual 
termination of the monopoly assures the public good, because it allows the assimilation 
of artistic works into society, which is the ultimate objective of copyright law.” (citations 
omitted)); Rooks, supra note 105, at 257 (“Read literally, three fundamental policies are 
advanced by the [copyright] clause: (1) to promote learning . . .; (2) to benefit 
authors . . .; and (3) to ensure public access . . . . Of these three policies, two benefit the 
public and one the author; and the benefit to the author is a means to the ends of 
promoting learning and protecting the public domain.”); Hughes, supra note 109, at 291 
(“Intellectual property is often the propertization of what we call ‘talent.’”). 
111 See Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics Behind Copyright Fair 
Use: A Principled and Predictable Body of Law, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 143, 158–59 (1993) 
(“Copyright law vests a bundle of rights in the creator of certain kinds of intellectual 
property. . . . Copyright law, both ancient and modern, is founded on the fundamental, 
though perhaps implicit, notion that adverse economic incentives are created if 
unrestricted [use] of intellectual products is permitted.  When adverse incentives exist, 
society will not have as much creative innovation as it wishes to encourage.  Therefore, 
the emphasis of copyright law is on the benefits derived by the public from the creative 
efforts of authors.  Reward to copyright owners or authors is a necessary but secondary 
consideration.” (citations omitted)); cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 14.03 
(discussing the copyright owner’s remedies with respect to the infringer’s profits). 
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author’s “exclusive rights.”112 The second category comprises all 
uses not in the first category; these uses remain freely available to 
the general public.113 
Under this system, if someone wishes to use a copyrighted 
work in one of the ways designated as an exclusive right—for 
example, if one wishes to copy or distribute the work—that person 
must first obtain the permission of the author of the work.114  
When so inclined, the author typically bestows his or her 
permission in the form of a license, which is granted for a fee.115  
Consequently, through the mechanism of exclusive rights, the 
 
112 See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 2.18; I. Fred Koenigsberg, 
Copyrights, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC COPYRIGHT LAW 2002, at 142–44 (PLI Patents, 
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-010T, 
2002); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 1.14.2.3 (“Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act 
prescribes five exclusive rights in copyrighted works: the rights to reproduce, to 
distribute, to perform, to display and to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work.  Taken together these rights reflect Congress’ balanced judgment 
about the uses that a copyright owner must be able to prohibit in order to appropriate the 
value of its work through sales or licenses in the market place and about those uses that, 
in the interests of public access, must not be fettered by copyright.” (footnotes omitted)). 
113 See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393–94 (1968) 
(“The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control over all uses of his 
copyrighted work.  Instead, § 1 of the Act enumerates several ‘rights’ that are made 
‘exclusive’ to the holder of the copyright.  If a person, without authorization from the 
copyright holder, puts a copyrighted work to a use within the scope of one of these 
‘exclusive rights,’ he infringes the copyright.  If he puts the work to a use not enumerated 
in § 1, he does not infringe.” (footnotes omitted)); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 399 n.2 (1974) (“Use of copyrighted material not in 
conflict with a right secured [as an exclusive right] . . . , no matter how widespread, is not 
copyright infringement. . . . ‘[Public] use short of infringement is to be encouraged.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
114 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Copyright law 
forbids duplication, public performance, and so on, unless the person wishing to copy or 
perform the work gets permission . . . .”). 
115 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546–47 (1985) 
(“Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights to the owner of 
the copyright.  Under the Copyright Act, these rights—to publish, copy, and distribute the 
author’s work—vest in the author of an original work from the time of its creation.  In 
practice, the author commonly sells his rights to publishers who offer royalties in 
exchange for their services in producing and marketing the author’s work.” (footnotes 
and citations omitted)). 
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author of a copyrighted work gains the opportunity to obtain a 
financial reward for his or her creative labors.116 
In this way, the copyright law fulfills the constitutional 
objective of the promotion of the arts and sciences.  The 
mechanism of exclusive rights secures authors with property rights 
in their creative works, and thereby provides them with the 
opportunity for financial gain, the secular incentive to create.117  
This incentive assures an abundance of creative works and 
“reflects the belief that property rights [in creative works], properly 
limited, will serve the general public interest in an abounding 
national culture.”118 Finally, the mechanism of exclusive rights is 
 
116 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 13.01; Yen, supra note 106, at 518 
(“[C]opyright is necessary because in its absence those interested in using the author’s 
work would simply copy the work instead of buying it from the author.  Authors would 
then find their economic returns too small to justify the costs of authorship.  In such a 
situation authors might not produce, and social welfare would presumably suffer.  To 
remedy this problem, economic theory supports granting authors copyright in their 
works.  However, those rights are necessarily limited in scope, because copyright 
imposes costs on society in exchange for the benefits of induced creative activity. . . . 
[T]he owner of copyright rights will charge a monopoly price for her work [and t]he 
number of people who gain access to the work will therefore decrease. . . . Thus, the 
optimal degree of copyright protection is that amount which maximizes the difference 
between the benefits of induced creative activity and the costs of increased authors’ 
rights.” (footnotes omitted)). 
117 See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(“The Copyright Act promotes public access to knowledge because it provides an 
economic incentive for authors to publish books and disseminate ideas to the public.” 
(citation omitted)); Leval, supra note 106, at 1107–08 (“[C]opyright is intended to 
increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge. . . . The rights conferred by 
copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for 
their labors. . . . [The Constitution’s grant of copyright power to Congress] ‘is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved.  It is intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward . . . . The 
monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the 
public.’” (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 545–46) (citations omitted). 
118 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 1.14; see also Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to 
Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 43 (1994) [hereinafter Litman, Exclusive Right]  
(“This is the central justification for further enhancing the rights in the copyright bundle: 
without strong copyright protection, there will be no national information infrastructure.  
The public might believe that what it wants is unfettered access to copyrighted works in 
return for reasonable royalty payments to authors, but, if we let the public set the freight 
charges, we risk underproduction of freight.  If authors and publishers cannot reliably 
control their works, they will decline to make them available at all.”); Patterson, supra 
note 107, at 37 (“That copyright is a conditional right means that it is not so much a 
MTIMA FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:21 PM 
2004] TASINI AND ITS PROGENY 401 
“properly limited” or counterbalanced by the fact that outside of 
the exclusive rights, the public is free to use, enjoy, and build upon 
an author’s copyrighted work, thereby “allow[ing] others to draw 
[up]on these works in their own creative and educational 
activities.”119 
A. Classifying the “New Use” of Digital Re-Publication 
Each time a new technological advance or development 
provides a new means by which copyrighted works may be used or 
exploited, a challenge is presented to the balance between the 
 
reward as it is a quid pro quo.  The author receives the reward for making his or her 
original work of authorship accessible to all.  Contrary to the common notion, the reward 
is not for the act of creation, but for distribution to provide public access: public learning 
comes not from the creation of a work, but from reading and studying it, a truism that 
copyright owners have apparently managed to hide from courts for many years.”). 
119 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 1.14 (“The balance that copyright law strikes between 
the incentives that authors and publishers need to produce original works and the freedom 
that they and others need to draw on earlier copyrighted works rests on a judgment about 
social benefit.  To give greater property rights than are needed to obtain the desired 
quantity and quality of works would impose costs on users without any countervailing 
benefits to society.  To give fewer property rights than are needed to support this 
investment would give users freer access, but to a less than socially desirable number and 
quality of works.” (footnote omitted)).  Moreover, the mechanism of exclusive rights is 
not without limitation.  When the public interest so warrants, copyright doctrines such as 
fair use permit a person to engage in the exclusive rights without the copyright holder’s 
permission. See Sharon Appel, Copyright, Digitization of Images, and Art Museums: 
Cyberspace and Other New Frontiers, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 150, 167 (1999) 
(“[Exclusive] rights constitute the ‘bundle of rights’ that comprise copyright.  Thus, they 
constitute the core of copyright protection.  However, the Copyright Act also sets forth 
several limitations upon the exclusive rights.  The most important of these . . . is the 
doctrine of fair use, which permits unauthorized use of a copyrighted work where such 
use, as a matter of public policy, is ‘fair.’  The statutory provision regarding fair use 
provides that: ‘the fair use of a copyrighted work including such use . . . for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship or research is not an 
infringement of copyright.’” (footnote omitted)); Simone A. Rose, Johnny Can Read, but 
Can He “Surf”?  Harmonizing Copyright Law and Internet Ethics, 1 MINN. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 79, 96 (2000) (“At first blush, copyright protection appears to upset the 
constitutionally mandated balance between individualism and public dissemination of 
information.  It grants long-term exclusive rights in creative expression, without a 
substantive examination process to evaluate whether the creator has ‘earned’ these rights 
under the statute.  Nevertheless, the trade- off for the longer term is a narrowly defined 
set of exclusive rights, followed by a series of limitations such as fair use and first sale.  
These limits set property boundaries that take into account the public’s interest in the free 
dissemination of information.” (footnotes omitted)); see also infra Part IV. 
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author’s incentive/exclusive rights mechanism and the corollary 
objective of broad public access to creative works.120  Initially the 
courts, and often ultimately Congress, must decide whether the 
“new use” is one that falls within the category of exclusive rights, 
or if it is a use that should remain freely available to the public.121 
 
120 See Thornburg, supra note 2, at 237 (“Copyright law has always grappled with how 
to adjust to new mediums of expression.  In both the courts and Congress, advances in 
recording, reproducing, and distributing copyrighted works have always led to tension in 
fashioning appropriate mechanisms to protect authors without creating an imbalance or 
unfavorable results.  While copyright vests appropriate rights in an author in order to 
compensate her for her labor, it also seeks to protect the public from unreasonable 
seizures of works already in the public domain.”); Litman, Exclusive Right, supra note 
118, at 39 (“It is difficult for intellectual property laws to keep pace with technology.  
When technological advances cause ambiguity in the law, courts rely on the law’s 
purposes to resolve that ambiguity.  However, when technology gets too far ahead of the 
law, and it becomes difficult and awkward to apply the old principles, it is time for 
reevaluation and change.  ‘Even though the 1976 Copyright Act was carefully drafted to 
be flexible enough to be applied to future innovations, technology has a habit of 
outstripping even the most flexible statutes.’  The coat is getting a little tight.  There is no 
need for a new one, but the old one needs a few alterations.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO.101-
735, at 7 (1990))). 
121 See Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright 
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1309–10 (2003) (“The role of the 
common law and legislature is to balance property and liability interests. . . . If all 
property is subject to the legal balance between the exclusive owner and the public, then 
intellectual property is merely the realm in which the balancing is most explicitly 
acknowledged. . . . The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the power of Congress 
to adjust the balance of rights between authors, publishers, and the public. . . . The 
normative question is not whether such balancing can take place, but how to create a 
reasoned framework for setting or shifting the balance.” (footnotes omitted)); Wendy M. 
Pollack, Note, Tuning in: The Future of Copyright Protection for Online Music in the 
Digital Millennium, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2445, 2445 (2000) (“Since the advent of the 
Gutenberg printing press, copyright law and technology have been entangled in an 
ongoing legal chase.  In order to advance the quintessential goal of American copyright 
law, . . . Congress constantly must balance the law’s objectives: to promote widespread 
dissemination of original creative works, while providing incentives to authors and 
owners to create such works.  New technological advances continuously upset this 
balance by facilitating the ability to copy works without permission from copyright 
holders . . . . However, as developments such as radio, television, and video have 
demonstrated, worries over the demise of copyright protection have been overstated.  In 
fact, such technological developments usually have been met with a ceaseless round of 
amendments to the United States copyright laws.” (footnotes omitted)). But see Warner 
Lawson, Jr., Paul, Bishop & Meachum—Short-Lived Aberrations or Plagues-on-
Developing Due Process-Protections?, 20 HOW. L.J. 419, 427 (1977) (“Although the 
institution of property is ancient in comparison with liberty, interests in property appear 
more fragile and, thus more susceptible to attack.  Property is particularly vulnerable in 
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As has been the case in connection with many prior new uses 
for copyrighted material, the categorization of the new use of 
digital re-publication is not a simple task.  The copyright holders in 
Tasini, Greenberg, and Random House each took the position that 
digital re-publication should be regarded as an activity or use 
within the realm of the author’s exclusive rights.122  Although the 
copyright statute does not specifically refer to digital re-publication 
as an exclusive right, the plaintiff copyright holders argued that a 
person who digitally re-publishes copyrighted material is engaging 
in several of those uses that have been expressly enumerated as 
exclusive rights, specifically the exclusive rights of reproduction, 
distribution, and public display.123  Consequently, the copyright 
holders contended that they were entitled to control and profit from 
any digital re-publication of their works.124 
Although the defendants in Tasini, Greenberg, and Random 
House each asserted defenses in response to the copyright 
infringement claims interposed against them, they effectively 
conceded that digital re-publication simulates or incorporates some 
exclusive rights.125  In both Tasini and Greenberg, the defendants’ 
principal infringement defense was to characterize  digital re-
publication activities as conduct within one or more of the 
statutory “exemptions” which permit engagement in the exclusive 
rights without the copyright holder’s permission—in this case the  
§ 201(c) revision privilege.126  In Random House, where the 
dispute was between two licensees of the copyright holder, the 
defendant/subsequent licensee contended that Random House’s 
prior license was limited to the exercise of certain exclusive rights 
 
serving its contemporary purpose-protecting those claims upon which people rely in their 
daily lives from arbitrary deprivation.”). 
122 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001); Greenberg v. Nat’l 
Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001); Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta 
Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
123 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 498; Greenberg, 244 F. 3d at 1272 n.9; Random House, 150 
F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
124 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 491, 498; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1270; Random House, 150 
F. Supp. 2d at 614, 620–21. 
125 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272; Random House, 150 F. 
Supp. 2d at 621 n.6. 
126 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 492; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272. 
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in connection with the use of the copyrighted works in print 
media.127  The defendant argued that the copyright holders had 
legitimately granted the subsequent license, which authorized the 
defendant to engage in many of the same exclusive rights, but in 
connection with the use of the works in electronic media.128  Thus, 
notwithstanding their substantive copyright defenses, the 
defendants in all three cases implicitly conceded that digital re-
publication falls within the copyright holder’s exclusive rights. 
The identification of any of exclusive rights simulated by or 
incorporated within a new use for copyrighted material is a 
reasonable method by which to determine the appropriate 
author/exclusive rights versus public/free access classification for 
that new use.  It is not, however, the only reasonable method.  
Another legitimate approach to the new-use classification problem 
is to consider the new use as sui generis—that is, as an activity 
unique and distinguishable from any existing uses, including any 
exclusive rights that may be simulated by or incorporated within 
the new use. 
In deciding which uses of copyrighted material should be 
relegated to the copyright holder as exclusive rights, Congress has 
the opportunity to consider a variety of factors, including the 
nature of each particular use and the effect that removing the use 
from the public enjoyment is likely to have on the underlying 
objectives of copyright law.129  The fact that a new use simulates 
or incorporates an existing exclusive right, however, does not 
obviate the need to engage in the same analysis with respect to the 
new use.  Although a new use may simulate or incorporate one or 
more existing exclusive rights, that new use may also exhibit other 
characteristics and may also implicate policy issues independent of 
 
127 See Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 614. 
128 See id. 
129 See Garon, supra note 121, at 1326–27 (“Congress has the legislative authority to tip 
the balance in favor of copyright owners or towards the public on a case-by-case basis.  
Except for possible constitutional limitations, Congress can shape the balance across a 
wide spectrum of issues.” (footnote omitted)); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 1.14 (“The 
premise of social benefit imports a value judgment and an empirical judgment.  Every 
time Congress amends the Copyright Act, it makes a value judgment about the quantity 
and quality of literary, musical and artistic works that are socially desirable and an 
empirical judgment about the amendment’s probable efficacy in achieving that end.”). 
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those presented by any of the exclusive rights it might incorporate 
or resemble.  The presence of these additional characteristics and 
policy issues may compel an entirely different conclusion in the 
exclusive rights versus public free access assessment.130  
Accordingly, approaching the new use of digital re-publication as 
merely a simulation or combination of the exclusive rights of 
reproduction, distribution, and/or public display is somewhat akin 
to regarding a cake as merely a serving of eggs, milk, and flour. 
B. Fortnightly and Teleprompter: When Cable Television Was a 
“New Use” 
Evaluating digital re-publication as a sui generis use 
notwithstanding its simulation or incorporation of certain exclusive 
rights is not an entirely new idea.  Arguably, this was the approach 
undertaken by the Supreme Court when it was confronted with the 
classification question in connection with the then new 
technological use of cable re-transmission of network television 
broadcasts in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.131 
and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.132 
 
130 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to 
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 268 (1996) 
(“Cyberspace is arguably different from previous technologies that were traditionally 
covered by copyright law in many respects. . . . The argument that two things are 
different or alike is relative to a governing principle of relevancy.  It is one thing to show 
that digital technology differs from other technologies in terms of the way the 
information is represented, in the speed of processing information, and in the shape and 
costs of processors.  It is quite another thing to determine which of these differences is 
relevant for the assignment of rights in digitized products. . . . [O]ne should focus on the 
differences that are relevant to the promotion of the constitutional goals of copyright law.  
The relevant changes created by digital technology are those that affect the balance of 
power between copyright owners and users.”); Hamilton, supra note 106, at 343 
(“Congress’s power over copyright law [is] not ‘unlimited’ but rather tethered to the 
public purposes the [Copyright] Clause identifies.” (footnote omitted)); Peter Jaszi, 
Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 300 (1996) (“Net user’s 
understanding of rights and duties, grounded as that understanding is in an ethic of 
information sharing. . . . [I]nformation is a special kind of property, one which—unlike a 
ball or a jacket—improves, rather than degrades, with use. . . . [T]he understanding of 
rights in information which traditionally has characterized American copyright—one in 
which the public interest in reasonable access to information has been afforded as much 
weight, in balancing, as the private interest in control.”). 
131 392 U.S. 390, 393–94 (1968). 
132 415 U.S. 394, 399–400 (1974). 
MTIMA FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:21 PM 
406 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:369 
In the early efforts to commercially exploit cable television 
technology, cable network entrepreneurs often erected broadcast 
receiving antennae in or near remote regions, where residents were 
unable to receive network television broadcasts using only 
conventional television sets.133  These antennae were erected for 
the purpose of capturing network broadcasts being transmitted 
through the air, which were then re-transmitted via cable to area 
residents for a fee.134 
In response to this unauthorized use of their copyrighted 
broadcasts, the holders of the copyrights in televised programs 
instigated copyright infringement litigation against the cable 
entrepreneurs.135  The network copyright holders argued that cable 
re-transmission constituted an unauthorized engagement in one of 
their exclusive rights, specifically the exclusive right to perform 
their works publicly.136 
Although cable re-transmission at least simulated the public 
performance right,137 the Supreme Court refused to evaluate the 
 
133 See Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 399–400 (“The operations of [commercial cable] 
systems typically involved the reception of broadcast beams by means of special 
television antennae . . . , transmission of these electronic signals by means of cable or a 
combination of cable and point-to-point microwave to the homes of subscribers, and the 
conversion of the electromagnetic signals into images and sounds by means of the 
subscribers’ own television sets.” (footnotes omitted)). 
134 See id. 
135 See id.; Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 393. 
136 See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 396–97.  In a dissenting 
opinion in Teleprompter, Justice Blackmun argued that cable re-transmission constituted 
engagement in the exclusive right of reproduction: “A [cable operator] that builds an 
antenna to pick up telecasts in Area B and then transmits it by cable to Area A is 
reproducing the copyrighted work, not pursuant to a license from the owner of the 
copyright, but by theft.” 415 U.S. at 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Indeed, it would 
seem that cable re-transmission could be considered a combination or simulation of three 
separate exclusive rights: reproduction, distribution, and public performance or display. 
137 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556–57 (M.D. Fla. 
1993). (“Public distribution of a copyrighted work is a right reserved to the copyright 
owner . . . . The concept of display . . . covers ‘the projection of an image on a screen or 
other surface by any method, the transmission of an image by electronic or other means, 
and the showing of an image on a cathode ray tube, or similar viewing apparatus 
connected with any sort of information storage and retrieval system.’  The display right 
precludes unauthorized transmission of the display from one place to another, for 
example, by a computer system.  ‘Display’ covers any showing of a ‘copy’ of the work, 
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new use solely from the perspective of whether the public 
performance right or any other exclusive rights were simulated by 
the new use.138  Instead, emphasizing the fact that cable re-
transmission exhibited both exclusive right and public free access 
characteristics, the Court evaluated it as a sui generis activity.139  
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that cable re-transmission is 
closer in character to uses relegated to the public than it is to the 
exclusive right of public performance: 
[Television b]roadcasters perform.  Viewers do not 
perform.  Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play 
crucial roles in the total television process, a line is drawn 
between them.  One is treated as active performer; the 
other, as passive beneficiary. 
When [cable re-transmission] is considered in this 
framework, we conclude that it falls on the viewer’s side of 
the line.  Essentially, a [cable re-transmission] system no 
more than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive the 
broadcaster’s signals . . . . If an individual erected an 
antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed 
the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be 
“performing” the programs he received on his television 
set. . . . The only difference in the case of [cable re-
transmission] is that the antenna system is erected and 
owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur.140 
Although Congress would eventually overrule the Supreme 
Court and specifically designate cable re-transmission as an 
 
‘either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image or any other device or 
process.’” (citations omitted)). 
138 See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–400; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408 (“When a 
television broadcaster transmits a program, it has made public for simultaneous viewing 
and hearing the contents of that program.  The privilege of receiving the broadcast 
electronic signals and of converting them into the sights and sounds of the program 
inheres in all members of the public who have the means of doing so.  The reception and 
rechanneling of these signals for simultaneous viewing is essentially a viewer 
function . . . .”). 
139 See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–400; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408. 
140 Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–400 (footnotes omitted); see also Teleprompter, 415 
U.S. at 408. 
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exclusive right,141 it did so in a manner that lent credence to the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to approach cable re-transmission as 
no more than a simulation or combination of certain pre-existing 
exclusive rights.142  On one of the few occasions in the history of 
the American copyright law, Congress imposed a compulsory 
license143 in connection with its designation of cable re-
transmission as an exclusive right.144  This meant that although 
Congress granted television network copyright holders the right to 
profit from the new use of cable re-transmission, it did not grant 
them the right to control it.  Instead, Congress determined that 
given the nature of cable re-transmission, when considered in light 
of the underlying objectives of the copyright law, the public should 
be guaranteed the ability to engage in and enjoy the new use for 
copyrighted material.145 
 
141 See 17 U.S.C. § 111; Rooks, supra note 105, at 267–68. 
142 Rooks, supra note 105, at 267–68. 
143 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING REGIMES 
COVERING RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS i, iv (1997) (“A compulsory license 
is a statutory copyright licensing scheme whereby copyright owners are required to 
license their works to users at a government-fixed price and under government-set terms 
and conditions. . . . Compulsory licenses are an exception to the copyright principle of 
exclusive ownership for authors of creative works, and, historically, the Copyright Office 
has only supported the creation of compulsory licenses when warranted by special 
circumstances.  With respect to the cable and satellite compulsory licenses, those special 
circumstances were initially seen as the difficulty and expense of clearing all rights on a 
broadcast signal.”), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ (last visited Jan. 26, 
2004). 
144 See Baoding Hsieh Fan, When Channel Surfers Flip to the Web: Copyright Liability 
for Internet Broadcasting, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 619, 629–30 (2000) (“In response to two 
Supreme Court decisions that had held that cable retransmission of broadcast signals did 
not constitute copyright infringement under the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress amended 
the Copyright Act in 1976 to specify that retransmissions of broadcast signals—either 
local or distant, network or independent—are public performances and, therefore, fall 
within the exclusive rights granted by copyright protection.  Section 111 subjects 
secondary transmissions by cable systems to copyright liability by means of a 
compulsory license and payment of statutory license fees for certain retransmissions.  
Later, in order to facilitate the home satellite dish business, Congress passed the Satellite 
Home Viewer Act of 1988, which created the satellite carrier compulsory license.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
145 See id. (“A fundamental principle of copyright is that copyrighted works should not 
be exploited without the consent of the copyright owners.  The cable and satellite 
compulsory licenses are exceptions to this principle.  A compulsory license ‘represents a 
derogation from the basic copyright principles embodied in the Copyright Act that ensure 
to copyright owners the right to control the use of their creations.’  The cable and satellite 
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C. Digital Re-Publication: Sui Generis Use or a New Exclusive 
Right? 
In related contexts, other commentators have argued that 
digital use and dissemination of copyrighted material are quite 
distinct from any of the traditional uses of copyrighted material.146  
 
compulsory licenses comprise a statutory copyright licensing scheme whereby copyright 
owners are required to license their works to cable systems and satellite carriers at a 
government-fixed price and under government-set terms and conditions.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  For an in-depth discussion of the public interest in the interface between 
intellectual property dissemination and federal regulation of the telecommunication 
infrastructure, see Leonard M. Baynes & C. Anthony Bush, The Other Digital Divide: 
Disparity in the Auction of Wireless Telecommunications, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 351 
(2003). 
146 See, e.g., Garon, supra note 121, at 1335–36 (“Scholars have described the Internet 
as ‘a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication.’  The 
Internet can facilitate an ever expanding range of information flow and entertainment 
activities that include passive listening and viewing of music, film, and audiovisual 
works, interactive gaming, instant messaging, file sharing, collaborative authoring, and a 
host of other activities. . . . Digital storage and transmission also allow for virtually 
perfect reproduction of [material converted into digital formats], with the ability to copy 
and transmit each file having essentially no reproduction cost . . . . The format of the 
digital file results in a conflation of ideas, information, and the copyrighted expression, as 
the ‘computer file’ becomes the unitary metaphor for all three attributes of the work.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 
OR. L. REV. 19, 19–20 (1996) [hereinafter Litman, Revising] (“Our current copyright law 
is based on a model devised for print media, and expanded with some difficulty to 
embrace a world that includes live, filmed and taped performances, broadcast media, and, 
most recently, digital media.  That much is uncontroversial.  The suitability of that model 
for new media is much more controversial. . . . [S]ince any use of a computer to view, 
read, reread, hear or otherwise experience a work in digital form requires reproducing 
that work in a computer’s memory, and since the copyright statute gives the copyright 
holder exclusive control over reproductions, everybody needs to have either a statutory 
privilege or the copyright holder’s permission to view, read, reread, hear or otherwise 
experience a digital work . . . . [This syllogism, however,] neatly avoids addressing the 
policy question whether copyright should be defined in terms that convert individual 
users’ reading of files into potentially infringing acts, by insisting that Congress chose to 
set it up this way when it enacted the current law.” (footnotes omitted)); Pamela 
Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital 
Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 102–103 
(1993) (“[There is an] extraordinary array of electronic information tools now 
available . . . that permit users to experiment with the plastic nature of works in digital 
form.  By plasticity, I mean the ease with which such works can be manipulated, 
transformed, and/or inserted into other works.  Although many authors might prefer for 
their works to remain as fixed as they have traditionally been in printed form, the genie of 
plasticity cannot be pushed back into the bottle.  Digital manipulation is here to stay, for 
the manipulability of digital data is one of the key advantages of the digital medium.” 
MTIMA FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:21 PM 
410 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:369 
These commentators have emphasized the fact that digital use and 
dissemination involves attributes and applications far beyond 
anything contemplated by authors, publishers, and/or legislators 
when they have considered more traditional methods of 
reproduction, distribution, and/or public display of copyrighted 
material.147  Thus, it seems inappropriate to approach the 
 
(footnotes omitted)); Jed Scully, Beyond Napster—Is It Just Music? Or Are Judicial 
Resolutions Ineffective in Digital Commerce?, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 313, 319–20 (2002) 
(“From the beginning of the digital age and the decision to include digital expressive 
code as ‘literary works’ under the Copyright Act, there has been a continuing tension 
between ideas, concepts, systems, and common modes of expression in digital form on 
one hand, and digital works of authorship expressed in software and embedded in code in 
hardware on the other. . . . A more basic question remains in asking whether copyright 
law will work in a digital, untethered, global environment, or whether our understanding 
of copyright is too bound up with geographic metes and bounds, with paper and pen, 
Tower Record stores, and multiplex movie houses.” (footnote omitted)); Ivan K. Fong, 
Law and New Technology: The Virtues of Muddling Through the Digital Dilemma: 
Intellectual Property in the Information Age, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 443, 445, 447 
(2001) (book review) (“‘[M]any of the intellectual property rules and practices that 
evolved in the world of physical artifacts do not work well in the digital 
environment’ . . . . [U]nlike access to traditional media (reading a book, watching a 
movie, or listening to a CD), access to digital works inevitably requires the making of a 
copy, and that, unlike copying traditional works, copying digital works is easy, 
inexpensive, and produces perfect copies.  Add to that the fact that computer networks 
now make global distribution of that information inexpensive and nearly instantaneous, 
and one can easily see how existing copyright law, which might have prohibited (or at 
least tolerated) the individual copying contemplated in the analog world of traditional 
media, might be ill-suited to deal with the sort of mass copying rendered simple and 
commonplace on the Internet.”). 
147 See Scully, supra note 146, at 319 (“The nature of experimentation and development 
of derivative works, of criticism, analysis, even hacking for analytical purposes, 
necessarily involves digital copying to engage in those protected functions in a way 
unnoticed and beyond the control of rights holders in an analog age.”); Elkin-Koren, 
supra note 130, at 254–55 (“Digitization . . . allows users to easily retransmit materials.  
Users may use scanners to digitize photos or texts that are published in a traditional form.  
A digitized copy that was delivered through the network may be downloaded by the user 
and retransmitted.  Retransmission through digitized versions is both easy and 
inexpensive.  Everything digitized may be reproduced in seconds and at low cost.  Self-
publishing is also available through network communication. . . . Cyberspace integrates 
the generation and distribution of information.  Digital networks provide direct 
communication between authors and potential readers. . . . Consequently, everyone with 
access to a computer network may become a publisher.  Network distribution creates a 
continuum that goes from personal writing on one hand, to publication on the other, with 
many degrees of connectivity and access permissions in between.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Pollack, supra note 121, at 2445 (“Digitization of copyrighted materials permits 
instantaneous, simplified copying methods that produce nearly perfect copies of originals.  
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classification of digital re-publication solely on the basis of its 
simulation or incorporation of these pre-existing exclusive 
rights.148 
Consistent with the policy objectives that underlie the 
copyright law, courts typically resist the entreaties of copyright 
holders to expand the realm of exclusive rights to a “default” 
classification option, to be invoked when confronted with a new 
technological use that does not easily fit into the exclusive 
rights/public free access dichotomy.149  Indeed, traditional judicial 
 
These copies can be digitally delivered to thousands of Internet users.  Decentralization 
and anonymity in cyberspace have allowed for the widespread dissemination of 
copyrighted materials without permission from their owners.” (footnotes omitted)). 
148 See Litman, Revising, supra note 146, at 36–37 (“When the old copyright laws fixed 
on reproduction as the compensable (or actionable) unit, it wasn’t because there was 
something fundamentally invasive of an author’s rights about making a copy of 
something.  Rather, it was because, at the time, copies were easy to find and easy to 
count, so they were a useful benchmark for deciding when a copyright owner’s rights had 
been unlawfully invaded. . . . They are less useful measures today. . . . By 
happenstance . . . , control over reproduction could potentially allow copyright owners 
control over every use of digital technology in connection with their protected works.  
This is not what the Congresses in 1790, 1870, 1909 and 1976 meant to accomplish when 
they awarded copyright owners exclusive reproduction rights.”); Samuelson, supra note 
146, at 53 (“When . . . new technology present[s] an issue that [can] not be readily 
answered from the copyright statute, the regulatory view of copyright would have courts 
go back to first principles to determine which result would best achieve the societal 
purposes of copyright law.” (footnote omitted)); Scully, supra note 146, at 322 (“[W]e 
must acknowledge in the law and in practice that controlling copyright by outlawing or 
preventing technological change is fruitless and self defeating.”). 
149 See Hamilton, supra note 106, at 326 (“ [W]hen new technologies appeared for 
which there was no existing analogy in the statute, the Court was inclined to deny authors 
the power to control or benefit from the new technology through copyright law. . . . [I]t 
took seriously the Copyright Clause’s charge to further the ‘Progress of Science [or 
knowledge] and useful Arts,’ and interpreted this language to mean that the Clause places 
the public interest ahead of all others.”); Litman, Revising, supra note 146, at 22 (“[T]he 
contours of [the digital technology/copyright] dispute don’t look very different from the 
shape of very similar disputes that arose in the 1980s, when the gods invented personal 
computers; or the 1970s, when they invented videocassette recorders; or the 1960s, when 
they invented cable television; or the 1920s, when they invented commercial 
broadcasting and talkies.  Arguing that Congress already considered a question, and 
resolved it in one’s favor then, is a common tactic in the history of copyright lobbying 
because it bypasses the problem of persuading Congress to consider the question and 
resolve it in one’s favor today.” (footnote omitted)); Fong, supra note 146, at 448 (“New 
technology and new business models for delivering content are almost always greeted 
with the belief that they will destroy the existing market.  In 17th century England, the 
emergence of lending libraries was seen as the death knell of book stores; in the 20th 
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construction of American copyright as positive law imposed for 
the public benefit mandates the rejection of an exclusive rights 
“default” approach.150 
 
century, photocopying was seen as the end of the publishing business, and videotape the 
end of the movie business.  Yet in each case, the new development produced a new 
market far larger than the impact it had on the existing market.  Lending libraries gave 
inexpensive access to books that were too expensive to purchase, thereby helping to make 
literacy widespread and vastly increasing the sale of books.  Similarly, the ability to 
photocopy makes the printed material in a library more valuable to consumers, while 
videotapes have significantly increased viewing of movies.” (footnote omitted)). 
150 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“‘The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the 
terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his 
writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and 
progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited 
periods the exclusive rights to their writings.’  Congress thus seeks to define the rights 
included in copyright so as to serve the public welfare and not necessarily so as to 
maximize an author’s control over his or her product.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, 
at 7 (1909)); REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON GENERAL REVISION OF THE 
COPYRIGHT LAW I-5 (1961) (“The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under 
the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his 
writings, for the Supreme Court has held that such rights as he has are purely statutory 
rights. . . . The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides that Congress 
shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-
2222 (1908)); Brown, supra note 105, at 592–93 (“The copyright-patent clause is the 
only one of the enumerated powers of Congress that is prefaced by a statement of 
purpose: ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’  The clause does not say 
‘to maximize the returns to authors and inventors.’ . . . [W]hen one considers the 
solemnity of the clause, the Supreme Court’s continuing concern for the public good, and 
the deeply rooted understanding that copyright flows from acts of Congress and not from 
natural right, one thing seems clear.  When Congress legislates and courts fill in the blank 
spaces, both branches need ways to assess and balance the expected public good and 
private rewards.” (footnotes omitted)); Garon, supra note 121, at 1306–07 (“The power 
to create a balance between the author and the public may be the most significant 
philosophical distinction between a natural rights theory of copyright and an economic 
rationale.  Under the natural rights theory, the power over one’s writings is a ‘sacred’ 
liberty that cannot be limited for the public good, whereas the economic rationale allows 
for a balancing between the interests of the public in accessing the good and the right of 
the author to receive an economic reward.” (footnotes omitted)); Patterson, supra note 
107, at 4 (“[T]he Copyright Clause is specifically a limitation on, as well as a grant of, 
Congress’s power.  The limitations are manifest in three basic policies expressed in the 
Copyright Clause: the promotion of learning . . . ; the protection of the public domain . . . 
; and the benefit for the author . . . .  The policies are not wholly consistent—protection of 
the public domain necessarily limits the benefit to the author—and the careful phrasing of 
the Copyright Clause to include them all indicates a specific purpose: protection against 
the misuse of copyright.  A misuse would occur, for example, if a copyright owner used 
copyright to inhibit rather than promote learning . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Rooks, supra 
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When the traditional copyright analogues do not satisfactorily 
apply, it is appropriate for Congress to act.151  Congress is best 
equipped to determine the appropriate manner in which to 
interpret, apply, and if necessary, amend the copyright law in order 
to address a sui generis challenge to the constitutional copyright 
objective and the established copyright framework.152  It is the 
 
note 105, at 258 (“[T]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither 
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.  Rather, the limited 
grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.  It is intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors . . . and to allow the public access to the products 
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
151 See Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface: An Emerging 
Solution to an Intractable Problem, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 363, 406 (2002) (“[I]n the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the Congress did legislate specifically with respect to 
the use of copyright as a tie to control an aftermarket.  In its amendments to [§] 117, 
Congress formulated a more precise policy about the use of copyrighted software as a 
tying product.  Congress, in effect, told us that a copyrighted software program which is 
activated whenever equipment is turned on may not be leveraged to control the market 
for maintenance and repair services of that machine.” (footnote omitted)); Litman, 
Revising, supra note 146, at 31–32 (“Copyright owners . . . have never been entitled to 
control all uses of their works.  Instead, Congress has accorded copyright owners some 
exclusive rights, and reserved other rights to the general public. . . . Indeed, it is 
conventional to argue that copyright holders should receive only such incentives as are 
necessary to impel them to create and disseminate new works.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Mtima, supra note 33, at 406 (“In 1998 the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (‘DMCA’) 
became law, amending various aspects of the copyright law to address some of the 
unique issues presented by advances in digital information technology . . . . Among other 
things, the DMCA virtually extinguishes Internet access provider liability in connection 
with the misconduct of third parties, such as cybersquatters and bulletin board operators 
and/or users.  In addition, the DMCA generally prohibits the circumvention of encryption 
and other mechanisms implemented to protect copyrighted material . . . . [Yet another] 
significant change resulting from the enactment of the DMCA . . . concerns . . . RAM 
copies . . . [—the] “copying” [that] occurs when a computer program is transferred from a 
permanent storage device to a computer’s random access memory . . . . As a result of the 
passage of the DMCA, [unauthorized] RAM copying [under certain] circumstances no 
longer constitutes copyright infringement . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
152 See, e.g., Litman, Revising, supra note 146, at 33–34 (detailing previous 
Congressional provisions for specific technologies); Samuelson, supra note 146, at 63 
(“Taking a regulatory approach to resolving a hotly contested case involving a new 
technology issue is particularly appropriate when copyright claimants make 
unprecedented claims about the reach of their rights . . . .”); Fong, supra note 146, at 447 
(“Further complicating these issues . . . are the wide-ranging and often conflicting 
interests of multiple stakeholders, which range from intellectual property creators to 
intellectual property distributors, schools and libraries, the general public, and other 
consumers and producers of intellectual property (governmental organizations, private 
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responsibility of Congress to assess whether the overarching goals 
of the copyright law are best served by designating a new use as an 
exclusive right, a use as to which the public should be given free 
reign, or a use that warrants the application of a customized 
response, such as a compulsory license.153 
Until the issue of classification of digital re-publication is 
placed squarely before the courts and/or Congress, however, 
existing precedent remains based on the premise that digital re-
publication simulates, incorporates, or otherwise impinges upon at 
least some of the copyright holder’s existing exclusive rights.154  
From this perspective, a defendant accused of copyright 
infringement through digital re-publication must either prove 
possession of an appropriate license, as successfully argued by the 
 
sector organizations, journalists, and standards organizations); Cynthia M. Ho, Attacking 
the Copyright Evildoers in Cyberspace, 55 SMU L. REV. 1561, 1561–62 (2002) (“In the 
context of copyrights on the Internet, different evildoers are identified, depending on who 
is asked to identify the evildoers.  For example, to most consumers, the evildoers in 
cyberspace are the copyright owners that have stripped the Internet of its freewheeling 
nature by removing things such as the file-sharing tool Napster.  On the other hand, major 
copyright owners vilify consumers—and those who assist them—for making copies of 
copyrighted material with little regard for whether the consumers own original copies.  
The identification of evildoers implicitly discounts the possibility that parties merely 
possess differing, but reasonable views.  Rather, the current polarized vision of evildoers 
has created a situation in which consumers are immune to allegations of copyright piracy 
and content owners rush to create new methods—whether legal or technological—to halt 
consumer copying.” (footnotes omitted)).  Recognizing and reconciling these diverse 
interests—and the need to view the issues through the lenses of technology, law, 
economics, psychology and sociology, and public policy—are important first steps in the 
balancing exercise that is at the heart of the current digital policy debate . . . .”). 
153 See Hughes, supra note 109, at 288 (“As our attention continues to shift from 
tangible to intangible forms of property, we can expect a growing jurisprudence of 
intellectual property.  The foundation for such a jurisprudence must be built from an 
understanding of the philosophical justifications for property rights to ideas . . . .”); 
Litman, Exclusive Right, supra note 118, at 33–34 (“[B]efore we succumb to calls for 
further enhancement of the rights in the copyright bundle, we need to reexamine the 
intellectual property bargain from the vantage point of the public, on whose behalf, after 
all, the copyright deal is said to be struck in the first place.” (footnotes omitted)).  For 
example, the compulsory license mechanism seems well suited to address many of the 
dilemmas presented by digital information technology.  I will explore this question as a 
solution to the problem of copyright infringement through the use of MP-3 technology in 
a forthcoming article. 
154 See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
MTIMA FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:21 PM 
2004] TASINI AND ITS PROGENY 415 
defendant in Random House,155 or must demonstrate that his or her 
digital re-publication activities qualify for exemption from the 
requirement that they be conducted with the copyright holder’s 
consent, the strategy pursued by the defendants in Tasini and 
Greenberg.156 
As discussed in Part I, the principal argument advanced by the 
defendants in Tasini and Greenberg was that their activities were 
exempt from the requirement of authorization by the copyright 
holder because they fell within the revision privilege provided by  
§ 201(c).  The validity of this position, particularly with respect to 
exact digital replicas of printed works, is explored in the next 
section. 
III.  UNAUTHORIZED DIGITAL RE-PUBLICATION AND § 201(C) 
As discussed in Part II, copyright holders are granted certain 
exclusive property rights in their works.  When others encroach 
upon these rights, the law provides the copyright holder with an 
action for copyright infringement.157 
A claim of copyright infringement in the electronic 
media/digital re-publication context involves the same sequential 
analysis as in assessing infringement claims raised in connection 
with traditional media.  First, the court must determine that the 
plaintiff has demonstrated ownership of a valid copyright.158  
 
155 See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
156 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488; Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 
1270 (11th Cir. 2001). 
157 See Appel, supra note 119, at 170 (“Copyright infringement is defined as the 
unprivileged violation of any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.  Thus, 
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, publication, performance, or public display of a 
copyrighted work without permission of the copyright owner amounts to infringement 
unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Pollack, supra note 121, at 2456 (“The Copyright Act does not 
require a showing of intent on the part of a direct infringer, hence, the infringer is liable 
whether or not he was aware that he was using copyrighted material in an illegal manner.  
Infringement occurs even when only one copy of a work is made, for example, where a 
consumer reproduces a copy solely for private purposes.” (footnotes omitted)). 
158 A certificate of copyright registration constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity 
of a copyright. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 
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Second, the plaintiff must adduce evidence that the defendant has 
engaged in one or more of the exclusive rights in connection with 
original constituent elements of the copyrighted work.159 
Where there is no dispute regarding the validity of the 
plaintiff’s copyright, analysis of the infringement claim begins 
with a determination of whether the unauthorized electronic 
publication involves one or more of the exclusive rights, and if so, 
which ones.160  Once it has been established that the unauthorized 
electronic activity involves one or more of the exclusive rights, the 
resolution of the infringement claim will turn on the nature of the 
defense raised in support of the unauthorized use.161  Unless the 
infringement defendant asserts some claim of license, he or she 
must rely instead upon one of the copyright defenses that permit 
 
1995) (citing Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 
1990)).  Unless such prima facie validity is affirmatively rebutted by the copyright 
defendant, the copyright plaintiff need only demonstrate unauthorized copying to 
establish her cause for infringement. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 
F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir. 1993). 
159 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 587 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984); 
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1266 (2001); Rogers v. Koons, 
960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1992); SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 
2d 1075, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line 
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1366–67 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Ryan C. 
Edwards, Note, Who Said Nothing in This World Is Free? A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc.: Problems Presented, Solutions Explored, and Answers Posed, 89 KY. L.J. 835, 842–
43 (2000/2001); see generally Koenigsberg, supra note 112, at 148. 
160 See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620–24 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002); Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. 
Supp. 611, 613; Koons, 960 F.2d at 306; cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 13.01 
(outlining the necessary elements in an infringement action).  Identifying the specific 
exclusive rights at issue from the outset can be helpful in efficiently evaluating the 
infringement claim, in as much as analyzing a claim of unauthorized reproduction, for 
example, is likely to involve different factual issues and evidentiary findings than 
analyzing a claim of unauthorized production of a derivative work. 
161 See generally e.g., Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (analyzing the meaning of 
the contract language, in a case in which the defendant claimed that the authors’ licensing 
agreements with the plaintiff did not grant electronic rights). 
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engagement in the exclusive rights without the copyright holder’s 
consent.162 
A. Interpreting § 201(c)  in the Wake of Tasini and Greenberg 
In Tasini and Greenberg, the publishers were unable to 
produce license agreements authorizing their digital re-publication 
activities.163  Instead, they sought refuge in the revision privilege 
embodied in § 201(c), which permits publishers to use contributory 
works in revisions without the authorization of the authors of those 
works.164 
The courts did not agree with the plaintiffs’ expansive 
interpretation of § 201(c).  The courts in Tasini and Greenberg 
held that the reproduction of a printed collective work into a digital 
format can result in both the disassembly of the work and the 
dissolution of the publisher’s creative editorial contribution, and 
thereby constitute an entirely new publication of the contributory 
works.165  In such cases, the digital re-publication does not qualify 
as a revision within the meaning of § 201(c).166 
The principal holding in both Tasini and Greenberg—that the 
nature and extent of any alterations made to the original collective 
work in producing a subsequent version will determine whether 
that version is a revision of the original or a new work167—seems 
 
162 Compare id., with N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 488 (2001).  In Tasini, 
unlike Random House, the defendant publishers looked to the § 201 “privilege,” rather 
than to any contract language. 
163 See Alan Gruber, Note, Interpretation of “Revision” Under the Copyright Act Spells 
Trouble for Publishers: Greenberg v. National Geographic Society, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 223, 229 (2002) (“Over the last twenty years, technological advancements 
and their rapid emergence and integration into the daily lives of many, caught some off-
guard, including publishers.  This is demonstrated by the noticeable absence of a clause 
addressing copyright ownership in electronic databases in Greenberg’s and other 
freelancer[s’] contracts.”); cf. Vermylen, supra note 92, at 198 (“[In Random House the 
publisher] relied on . . . clauses in its contracts with the authors—clauses that are 
common in publishing contracts—to advance its argument that the contracts signed by 
the authors decades ago foreclosed the authors from selling electronic rights to any third 
party.” (footnote omitted)). For further discussion in this area, see Part V. 
164 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272. 
165 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502–04; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73. 
166 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502–04; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73. 
167 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 496–97; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73. 
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in retrospect fairly straightforward.  Thus, whether the later version 
is produced in print, digital format, or some other medium, Tasini 
and Greenberg clarify that the § 201(c) revision privilege is a 
narrow one, which permits only an appropriate updating of the 
original collective work as a whole, and does not extend to changes 
to the individual contributory works therein, the use of the 
contributory works in the creation or assembly of a new collective 
work, or similar incursions into the author’s realm of exclusive 
rights.168 
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Tasini distinguished a 
publisher’s § 201(c) revision privilege from the independent ability 
of contributory authors to affirmatively license their exclusive 
rights.169  The Court explained that the revision privilege should 
not be construed as a de facto license to engage in any of the 
contributory authors’ exclusive rights.170  Rather, § 201(c) merely 
provides publishers a limited “privilege” to impinge upon certain 
rights in order to undertake a specified activity such as updating or 
revising a collective work.171  Any “non-revision” engagement in 
the contributory authors’ exclusive rights, electronic or otherwise, 
must be specifically licensed by the individual copyright holders 
and effectuated in accordance with the provisions of the copyright 
statute.172 
 
168 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 496–97; Greenberg, 244 F. 3d at 1272–74.  Thus, in a very 
real sense the opinions in Tasini and Greenberg have more to do with the clarification of 
§ 201(c) than with the specific application of the copyright law to the new information 
technologies.  Had the works at issue not been collective works, the courts’ initial 
confrontation with the digital re-publication issue would likely have required a broader 
application of the copyright law, as opposed to the divination of a relatively obscure 
copyright privilege in connection with a narrow specie of copyrighted material. 
169 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 503–04. 
170 See id. at 496–97, 500–01, 503–04. 
171 Thus, the revision privilege is distinguished from the publisher’s own independent 
copyright and exclusive rights in the collective work as a whole.  The revision privilege 
merely serves to prevent the restoration of the author’s contributory work copyright from 
becoming a “veto power” against the publisher’s ability to revise and update the 
collective work, which benefits society.  See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 
815–16 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that there is “a competing goal of ensuring that 
collective works be marketed and distributed to the public”), rev’d and remanded, 206 
F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
172 Emphasizing the distinction between the basis for the collective work copyright and 
the purpose and parameters of the revision privilege also supports the conclusion that 
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B. Exact Digital Replicas: Revisions or New Publications? 
In clarifying the breadth of the revision privilege, however, the 
Tasini and Greenberg analyses also raised some unresolved issues 
specifically pertinent to digital re-publication.  In reaching their 
respective decisions, both courts cited certain attributes inherent to 
digital media, such as the ability to retrieve individual articles 
independent of the collective work as a whole and the secondary 
market impact of such attributes, as among the principal bases for 
their decisions.173  The digital re-publications at issue in Tasini and 
Greenberg all reflected changes to the content of the original print 
versions on which they were based.174  On the other hand, the cited 
attributes and market impact ramifications remain an issue where 
the subsequent version is an exact digital replica of the original.  
Accordingly, an important question left open by Tasini and 
Greenberg is whether a full-image, exact digital replica of a 
collective work with no additions or deletions to the content of the 
original print version qualifies as a § 201(c) revision. 
As cogently argued by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Tasini, 
the disqualification of a digital re-publication as a § 201(c) revision 
solely on the basis of attributes unique and inherent to electronic 
media formats contradicts the doctrine of media neutrality.175  
 
exact digital replicas are not § 201(c) revisions.  The basis for the publisher’s copyright is 
his or her own creative contribution in arranging and editing the collective work.  
Although a subsequent version of a collective work must reflect the publisher’s original 
editorial contribution in order to qualify as a § 201(c) revision, the fact that it does so 
does not end the § 201(c) analysis.  In addition to the publisher’s creative contribution, 
the subsequent version might contain other features and attributes inconsistent with the 
purposes of § 201(c). See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502 n.10.  Thus, an exact digital replica will 
obviously reproduce the publisher’s original editorial contributions, but does not revise or 
update the work.  Likewise, if a subsequent version of a collective work does not reflect 
the editorial content of the original version, the original work has not been “revised,” but 
rather an entirely new collective work has been assembled. 
173 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497–500; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1269. 
174 As discussed in Part I, the digital re-publications in Tasini were either content-altered 
electronic versions or full-image compendiums of previously independent editions or 
works. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 490–91. In Greenberg, previously independent issues were 
collectively reproduced and combined with entirely new material on the NG-CD. See 
Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1268–70. 
175 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 512–13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“No one doubts that the 
New York Times has the right to reprint its issue in Braille . . . or in microform, even 
though such revisions might look and feel quite different from the original.  Such 
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Although there were no “absolutely exact” digital replicas at issue 
in Tasini, if the reasoning of the majority is taken to its logical 
conclusion, Justice Stevens’ arguments prove quixotic.  A printed 
collective work that is updated to include a more recent article falls 
squarely within § 201(c), so long as the updating is undertaken in 
print.176  Under the reasoning of the Tasini majority, however, if 
the updated version is produced in digital format, it would be 
regarded as a new publication of its contributory works and 
therefore disqualified as a revision.177 
Although neither Tasini nor Greenberg actually decides the 
issue, the two courts appear to have contradictory views of exact 
digital replicas with respect to § 201(c).  The Greenberg court 
observed that if it were dealing only with the Replica portion of the 
NG-CD, the fact that it is an exact digital replica of the original 
printed back issues of National Geographic Magazine would seem 
to preclude its characterization as a new work.178  The court also 
considered, and ultimately rejected, the option of classifying the 
Replica as a derivative work—“a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”179  
The court concluded that “in order to qualify as a derivative work, 
the resulting work . . . after transformation must qualify as an 
‘original work of authorship.’  Thus, the mere electronic digital 
 
differences, however, would largely result from the different medium being employed.  
Similarly, the decision to convert the single collective work newspaper into a collection 
of individual ASCII files can be explained as little more than a decision that reflects the 
different nature of the electronic medium. . . . The bare-bones nature of ASCII text would 
make trying to wade through a single ASCII file containing the entire content of a single 
edition of the New York Times an exercise in frustration.”).  While Justice Stevens’ 
concerns regarding the doctrine of media neutrality are compelling, recognizing that the 
reproduction of a printed work into digital format does not result in the creation of a new 
work does not lead to the conclusion that the digital result is a “revision.” 
176 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2003). 
177 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497–500. 
178 See Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272 (noting that the court was “[a]ssuming arguendo, 
but expressly not deciding, that 201(c)’s revision privilege embraces the entirety of the 
Replica portion of the [NG-CD]”). 
179 Id. at 1274 n.14 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
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reproduction . . . may not qualify as a derivative work . . . .”180  
Accordingly, the Greenberg court seemed prepared to grant exact 
digital replicas § 201(c) revision status. 
In contrast, certain rulings by the Supreme Court in Tasini cast 
considerable doubt upon the eligibility of exact digital replicas for 
sanctuary under § 201(c).  For one thing, the Court ruled that the 
New York Times’ GPO CD, a full-image replica product, did not 
qualify as a § 201(c) revision.181  The ruling is not dispositive, 
however, because the Court appears to have based its ruling in part 
upon the fact that the GPO CD includes more than one edition of 
the New York Times, as well as digital replicas of other periodicals, 
all on a single disc.182  Accordingly, the Court understandably 
considered this kind of compilation of independent collective 
works as something other than a revision of each of the 
independent collective works therein.183 
 
180 Id. 
181 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500 (“One might view the articles as parts of new 
compendium—namely, the entirety of works in the Database.”). 
182 See id. at 499–502 n.11 (“The dissenting opinion apparently concludes that, under 
the banner of ‘media-neutrality,’ a copy of a collective work, even when considerably 
changed, must constitute a ‘revision’ of that collective work so long as the changes were 
‘necessitated by . . . the medium.’  We lack the dissent’s confidence that the current form 
of the Databases is entirely attributable to the nature of the electronic media, rather than 
the nature of the economic market served by the Databases.” (citation omitted)). 
183 For certain purposes, it might be appropriate to treat compilations of the same 
periodical, for example, all editions of the New York Times for 1990, differently from a 
compilation of different periodicals, say a compilation of all national newspapers 
published in 1990.  In any case, while neither a compendium or a compilation constitutes 
a revision, other commentators have also questioned whether such versions should be 
considered entirely new works. See Albert & Barzilay, supra note 56, at 17 (“Publishers 
should . . . consider keeping the electronic versions of their publications as similar as 
possible to their print format. . . . The language in Tasini suggests that this format would 
qualify as a ‘revision’ of the original periodical issue, and thus the rights would belong to 
the publisher, thereby defeating a Tasini-style claim by authors.”); Wendy Gordon, Fine-
Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic Distribution and Reproduction, 66 BROOK. L. 
REV. 473, 486 (2000) (“[I]t is hard to imagine that merely collecting several verbatim, 
full-format issues of [various collective works] on a disk together . . . makes a new 
‘version’ that exceeds the [§ 201(c)] privilege, any more than a library infringes a 
copyright holder’s rights when it binds journal issues together in a hard-cover volume.” 
(footnote omitted)).  As discussed in Part III.D, however, while an exact digital replica 
should not be regarded as a new work, it should not be considered a “revision” of the 
original work. 
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Nonetheless, even if each GPO CD contained no more than an 
exact replica of only a single edition of the New York Times, it 
does not follow that the Tasini majority would allow it as a § 
201(c) revision.184  If the resulting electronic product is amenable 
to Boolean searches and individual article retrieval, these attributes 
would present the contributory articles outside the context of the 
original collective work and would have an impermissible impact 
on the “stand-alone” secondary market for such works.185  
Consequently, it appears that the Tasini majority would regard an 
exact digital replica as a new publication for the purposes of 
applying § 201(c).186 
C. Exact Digital Replicas Are Not § 201(c) Revisions 
The issue of exact digital replicas crystallizes the tension 
between the views of the majority and dissent in Tasini.  It is 
possible, however, to reconcile these competing views.  Indeed, 
they can be reconciled not only with respect to exact digital 
replicas, but perhaps also with respect to most content-altered 
digital re-publications as well.  By basing the qualification of a 
digital re-publication as a § 201(c) revision on the content of the 
digital version, as opposed to its digital media attributes, the 
conflict with the doctrine of media neutrality can be avoided. 
D. What Constitutes a Revision? 
There are a variety of changes that can be made to a printed 
work that go beyond merely revising the work, but fall short of 
creating an entirely new work or publication.  Depending upon the 
purpose and nature of the changes made to the original version of a 
work, there are different kinds of versions that will result from 
these changes. 
In general, the label given to each resulting version also 
signifies the purpose in undertaking the subsequent version.187  For 
 
184 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 503. 
185 See id. at 497. 
186 See id. at 502–04. 
187 See, e.g., NAT G. BODIAN, BODIAN’S PUBLISHING DESK REFERENCE: A 
COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES FOR BOOK AND JOURNAL 
MARKETING AND BOOKSELLING 3 (1988) (defining abridgment as “[e]limination of 
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example, when a work is translated into a different language, the 
resulting version is referred to as a translation; when a new version 
is undertaken in order to correct significant errors in the original, 
the result is often referred to as an emendation; when the original 
version of the work is streamlined to delete nonessential or 
extraneous matter, the resulting version is sometimes referred to as 
an abridgment.188  Indeed, in some cases, in order to properly 
characterize the result of even a single change to the original 
version, it might be necessary to know the specific purpose for the 
change.  The removal of material might be an emendation if the 
material was included in error or an abridgement if the material is 
subsequently considered non-essential to a particular audience or 
market for the work.189 
A revision is commonly understood as a purposeful alteration 
of content undertaken for some substantive reason.190  Purely 
cosmetic alterations, such as changing font size or designing a new 
cover for a work, generally do not result in the production of a 
substantive revision.191  Likewise where an exact replica of the 
 
sections of a book, or the rewriting of the text in condensed form so as to make the text 
desirable to a different audience, of to broaden the market for an expensive library work 
to individuals by price reduction”). 
188 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 4, 377, 1254 (10th ed. 1993) 
[hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S] (defining abridgement as “a shortened form of a work 
retaining the general sense and unity of the original”; defining emendation as “an 
alteration designed to correct or improve” and which is usually “textual”; defining 
translation as “a change to a different substance, form, or appearance: conversion”); see 
also BODIAN, supra note 187, at 3. 
189 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 186, at 377; BODIAN, supra note 187, at 3. 
190 According to WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, to revise is “to alter something already 
written or printed, in order to make corrections, improve or update.” RANDOM HOUSE 
WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1113 (2d ed. 1997); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, 
supra note 188, at 1005 (defining revision as an “alteration” or “mak[ing] a new, 
amended, improved, or up-to-date version”). 
191 See DAVID M. BROWNSTONE & IRENE M. FRANCK, THE DICTIONARY OF PUBLISHING 
238 (1982) (defining revision as “1.  The process of altering a body of written work; for 
example, alterations made in a manuscript by its author at any stage of manuscript 
preparation, alterations made in a published work in preparation for issuance of a new 
edition, or alterations made in a contract being negotiated.  2.  A new edition of a 
previously published work, containing alterations amounting to more than corrections; 
often including updating materials, as in a textbook or annual.  Also called a revised 
edition.”). 
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original work is produced, the result is not a revision because 
nothing has been “revised.”192 
The reproduction of a printed work into a different medium 
may result in any of the foregoing kinds of versions or even a new 
work altogether, depending upon the nature of the changes to its 
content that are undertaken in connection with its reproduction.  To 
label an exact digital replica of a printed work a “revision” is to 
treat that term as being synonymous with the term “version” or 
even “copy.”  It seems more appropriate to characterize an exact 
digital replica of a printed work as an “archive version” or an 
“archive copy”—that is, a version or copy made for archival 
purposes—as opposed to a substantive “revision” of the original 
printed version or an entirely new work.193 
Thus, while Tasini and Greenberg can be interpreted to stand 
for the proposition that certain changes to a collective work will 
render the result more than a mere revision of the original work, 
common sense copyright as well as ordinary custom and usage 
seem to dictate that where no changes are made to the content of 
the original version, the subsequent version is not a revision 
because the collective work has not actually been revised.  Indeed, 
exact digital replicas are particularly amenable to classification as 
“archive versions,” as opposed to revisions or new works, because 
in such cases the original work has not been revised or altered in 
any substantive way. 
 
192 See id. 
193 The same reasoning applies to printed works reproduced and stored on microfilm.  
Interestingly, however, each of the Tasini and Greenberg tribunals which compared the 
various defendants’ digital re-publications to microfilm seemed to take for granted that 
microfilm versions would qualify as revisions within § 201(c) and also in the ordinary 
sense of the term. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 501–02 (2001); 
Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1273 n.12 (11th Cir. 2001).  None 
of the courts explain, however, the basis for this assumption.  At least one other 
commentator has noted a contradiction in this reasoning. See Thornburg, supra note 2, at 
245–46 (“It remains puzzling that while converting a year’s subscription to a magazine 
into microfilm is protected under [§] 201(c), a series of digital reproductions of that same 
year’s subscription burned onto a CD-ROM falls outside such protection when 
accompanied by a simple computer program that allows for easy searching.”).  In the 
present author’s view, the characterization of full-image microfilm reproductions as § 
201(c) revisions is incorrect.  Full-image microfilm reproductions are merely copies 
made for archival purposes, i.e., archive versions or archive copies. 
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In addition to being an “un-revised” archive version or copy, 
an exact digital replica can also be disqualified as a § 201(c) 
revision in accordance with the reasoning of the Tasini majority.  
As construed by the Supreme Court, the § 201(c) revision privilege 
exists to allow for the revising and updating of a collective work 
while preserving the commercial market for further publication of 
the individual contributions therein.194  However, virtually any 
revision of a previously published printed collective work, even a 
traditional updating in print, will arguably have at least some 
impact on the market for the individual contributions therein.  
Therefore, it seems reasonable to refine the definition of an 
impermissible market impact under § 201(c) to be that of a 
negative impact that is significantly greater than that which is 
likely to result from a traditional updating or revising of the 
original collective work. 
The content-altered digital re-publications in Tasini and 
Greenberg were held to virtually extinguish any secondary market 
for the contributory works contained therein, because once 
available online, there would be little need for alternative access to 
the works.195  An exact digital replica of a collective work, 
particularly when disbursed into an online commercial database, 
would likely have the same effect.  Accordingly, exact digital 
replicas can be disqualified from § 201(c) revision status on the 
same market impact grounds as the content-altered digital re-
publications at issue in Tasini.196 
 
194 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497 (“Essentially, § 201(c) adjusts a publisher’s copyright in 
its collective work to accommodate a freelancer’s copyright in her contribution.”). 
195 See id.; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1275.  Both courts implicitly held that such 
subsequent digital markets exist.  The basis for this assumption is questioned in Part IV. 
196 Professor Gordon advances still another argument as to why a full-image digital 
replica does not qualify as a § 201(c) revision: 
Even if . . . exact full-format digital reproductions fall within the statutory 
privilege . . . infringement can still occur because freelancers have not only a 
reproduction right, but also an exclusive right of distribution. . . . [R]egardless 
of whether [the digital reproduction] infringes the copyright owner’s right of 
reproduction, a publisher exceeds his privilege of distribution when he allows 
individual articles to be downloaded because making an individual article 
available for download is not distributing it as “part of” the whole. 
Gordon, supra note 183, at 475 (footnote omitted). 
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It would seem preferable, however, to disqualify exact digital 
replicas as privileged revisions on the basis of their 
characterization as archive versions.  As a distinction based on 
content, it avoids conflict with the doctrine of media neutrality.  
Indeed, this distinction disqualifies all exact replicas from 
characterization as revisions on the basis of their content regardless 
of the medium in which they happen to be produced. 
E. Treating Content-Altered Digital Re-Publications as Archive 
Versions 
The characterization of digital re-publications as archive 
versions can also be used to reconcile the concerns of the majority 
and dissent in Tasini with regard to content-altered digital re-
publications.  While deleting illustrations, photographs, or chapter 
headings from a work would seem to be more than mere cosmetic 
changes, depending upon the reason for and nature of such 
changes, they might be more appropriately regarded as relating to 
the archiving of the work, as opposed to the substantive revision of 
the work.197 
The changes to the content of the collective works in Tasini 
were undertaken in connection with the efficient storage, 
preservation, and further dissemination of previously published 
material.198  Arguably, these changes, whether deleting 
photographs or column layouts, or combining otherwise exact 
digital replicas with other independent works on a single disc, are 
not purposefully substantive, but rather incidental to the efficient 
 
197 In its verb form, archive means “[t]o place or store in an archive; in Computing, to 
transfer to a store containing infrequently used files, or to a lower level in the hierarchy 
of memories esp[ecially] from disc to tape.” COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 69 
(2d ed. 1991).  In its noun form, an archive is “[a] place in which public records or other 
important historic documents are kept. . . . [or a] historical record or document so 
preserved.” Id.  Merriam-Webster’s defines an archive as “a place in which public 
records or historical documents are preserved.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 188, at 
61. 
198 Given the nature of electronic media, illustrations and photographs in print-to-digital 
transfers can arguably defeat many of the objectives in transferring the work into digital 
format.  Whereas text can be economically archived in digital format, photographs and 
illustrations take up enormous amounts of disc space.  Thus, the deletion of such material 
may not be “purposefully substantive” but rather, essential to efficient electronic 
archiving. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 512–13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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digital archiving of printed material.199  Such changes do not rise to 
the level of substantive revisions and also fall short of creating 
entirely new works.  Once again it seems more accurate to 
characterize the digital results as archive versions as opposed to 
substantive revisions or new collective works.  Moreover, just as 
with exact digital replicas, the characterization of content-altered 
digital replicas as archive versions permits their disqualification as 
§ 201(c) revisions on the basis of their content, as opposed to on 
the basis of characteristics unique and inherent to electronic 
media.200 
In sum, Tasini and Greenberg hold that digital re-publication 
can effectively result in the “dismantling” of a collective work and 
thereby constitute independent publications of the contributory 
works therein, or the production of an entirely new collective 
work.201  As discussed above, however, digital re-publication may 
be more accurately described as resulting in the production of an 
archive version or archive copy, depending upon the nature, extent, 
and reasons for any changes made to the content of the original 
version of the collective work.  If limited changes have been made 
to the original content primarily to take advantage of beneficial 
attributes inherent to digital media, then the digital result should be 
regarded as an archive version.  If no changes have been made to 
the content of the original version—that is, an exact digital replica 
has been produced—the result should also be considered an 
archive version or an archive copy.  Moreover, the characterization 
of digital re-publications as archive versions will generally lead to 
the same results as those reached in Tasini and Greenberg in 
applying § 201(c), but avoids conflict with the doctrine of media 
neutrality.202 
 
199 See id. 
200 The NG-CD in Greenberg is disqualified as a § 201(c) revision for the same reasons.  
While some of the changes made to the content of the original version, i.e., collecting all 
of the back issues of National Geographic Magazine onto a single disc, may have been 
undertaken for archival purposes, other changes, such as the creation and inclusion of the 
Animation Sequence, went beyond archival necessities. See Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1273.  
Thus, the NG-CD might be both an archive version and a derivative work, but in any 
case, more than a mere revision. 
201 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 487; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1273. 
202 There is, however, at least one situation under § 201(c) in which conflict with the 
doctrine of media neutrality seems unavoidable, at least with respect to the Tasini market 
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Thus, § 201(c) is of little value in addressing the problem of 
digital re-publication.  As discussed in the next section, however, 
the fair use doctrine presents a more viable mechanism for 
balancing the competing interests at issue in connection with the 
digital use and dissemination of previously published copyrighted 
works. 
IV.  DIGITAL RE-PUBLICATION AND THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE 
While § 201(c) offers a safe harbor for the unauthorized use of 
a contributory work as part of a revision of a collective work, the 
unauthorized use of any copyrighted work—contributory, 
collective, or singular—may also be defended by resort to the fair 
use doctrine.203  The fair use doctrine is an “equitable doctrine 
[which] permits other people to use copyrighted material without 
the owner’s consent in a reasonable manner for certain 
purposes.”204  The fair use doctrine enables the copyright law to 
 
impact rule.  Where the collective work is updated in accordance with the express 
provisions of the statute, such as when an article is added to the evening edition of a daily 
newspaper, or a 1990 edition updates a 1980 encyclopedia, then under the reasoning of 
the Tasini majority, if the updated version is produced in digital format, its market impact 
potential precludes its qualification as a § 201(c) revision.  Such a digital update could 
not be characterized as an archive version, however, because there has been an alteration 
in content for substantive as opposed to archival purposes.  Ironically then, the very kind 
of content (albeit perhaps not medium) change contemplated by Congress in revising  
§ 201(c) becomes impermissible under the holding in Tasini.  While this result is 
consistent with the judicial construction of the legislative objective underlying § 201(c), 
it does discriminate against electronic revisions in favor of print revisions. 
203 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (“Fair use was traditionally defined as ‘a privilege in others 
than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner 
without his consent.” . . . The statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the 
Copyright Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common law doctrine.” 
(citations omitted)); Leval, supra note 106, at 1105 (“Not long after the creation of the 
copyright law by the Statute of Anne of 1709, courts recognized that certain instances of 
unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted material, first described as ‘fair abridgment,’ 
later ‘fair use,’ would not infringe the author’s rights.  In the United States, the doctrine 
was received and eventually incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976 . . . .”).  An 
example of a fair use of copyrighted material is a limited educational use, such as 
copying and distributing a newspaper article for use as part of a classroom discussion. 
204 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (1992); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574–77 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 448–51 (1984); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th 
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account for those situations in which the social utilities to be 
achieved in permitting a specific use of copyrighted material 
warrant a limited impingement upon the copyright holder’s 
exclusive property rights.205  The fair use doctrine is one of the 
principal means by which the underlying policy objectives of the 
copyright law are attained, including the broadest dissemination of 
creative works toward the greater public good.206 
As it would be unworkable to predetermine a list of all 
circumstances in which the equitable social utilities outweigh the 
copyright holder’s interest in denying or restricting the use of his 
or her work, courts instead weigh four factors in evaluating 
whether an unauthorized use should be permitted as a fair use.207  
 
Cir. 1992); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 
2001); Koenigsberg, supra note 112, at 147–48; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 
13.05; Leval, supra note 106, at 1127 (“Fair use was a judge-made utilitarian limit on a 
statutory right.  It balances the social benefit of a transformative secondary use against 
injury to the incentives of authorship.”). 
205 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 10.2.1 (“At the highest level of generalization, 
[fair] uses characteristically involve situations in which the social, political and cultural 
benefits of the use will outweigh any consequent losses to the copyright proprietor, and in 
which the time and expense of negotiations—or, in [certain cases], the unwillingness of 
the copyright owner to permit these uses at an acceptable price—will often foreclose a 
negotiated transaction.”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 13.05[A][1]. 
206 See Samuelson, supra note 146, at 51 (“Fair use has historically served as a flexible 
and adaptable mechanism for balancing the interests of copyright owners, their 
competitors or potential competitors, and the public to fulfill the larger purposes of 
copyright law which have traditionally been understood to be promoting the production 
and dissemination of knowledge.”). 
207 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 13.05[A] (“Strictly speaking, Section 107 does 
not attempt to define ‘fair use.’  Rather, it lists ‘the factors to be considered’ for the 
purpose of ‘determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair 
use.’  It does not, and does not purport to, provide a rule that may automatically be 
applied in deciding whether any particular use is ‘fair.’” (footnote omitted)); Anderson & 
Brown, supra note 111, at 145–46, 159 (“Congress codified the copyright and fair use 
case law in the Copyright Act of 1976.  Section 107 of the Act governs fair use.  The 
preamble to [§] 107 lists several examples of what might be successful assertions of the 
fair use defense.  Drawing on prior case law, Congress enumerated four factors for 
determining whether a use qualifies as a fair use. . . . In [these] limited circumstances, fair 
use permits someone other than the author to [use] a copyrighted work without the 
author’s permission.”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“[]’[The] endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise 
in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute’[].  The statutory 
factors do, however, provide substantial guidance to courts undertaking the proper fact-
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These factors are (1) the purpose and the character of the use, such 
as whether it is primarily commercial in nature or if it is a 
transformative use—that is, a use that substantively enhances or 
builds upon the copyrighted work; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work involved—that is, whether it is primarily a creative work 
such as a fiction novel or a factual work such as a biography; (3) 
the amount and substantiality of the work to be used without the 
author’s permission; and (4) the effect that allowing the 
unauthorized use is likely to have upon the market for the 
copyrighted work.208  Properly applied, the four fair use factors 
assist courts in insuring that the author’s incentive mechanism of 
commercial gain through licensing exclusive rights does not 
override or impede the copyright law’s primary goal of “increasing 
society’s stock of knowledge.”209 
A. Fair Use in Tasini and Greenberg 
Considering the four fair use factors, pursuit of the § 201(c) 
revision privilege might well seem the more viable defense 
strategy to publishers in the position of the Tasini defendants.  The 
Tasini publishers were using the contributory works for 
commercial gain, and the nature of digital re-publication required 
 
specific inquiry.” (second citation omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 
(1976))). 
208 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Harper & Row, 471 
U.S. at 560 (“The factors enumerated in the [statute] are not meant to be exclusive . . . 
‘and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.’” (citation 
omitted)); Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal. 
2000); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1525 (D. Colo. 
1995); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 104, § 10.2 (“[S]ince passage of  the 1976 Act, courts 
typically and systematically apply all four factors.  Some courts apply additional 
factors.”); Edwards, supra note 159, at 847–48 (“The § 107 fair use factors find their 
roots in Justice Story’s now famous opinion in Folsom v. March, which courts frequently 
cite as the first American case to recognize the doctrine. . . . [N]early one hundred thirty-
five years after the Folsom decision, in 1976, Congress adopted the § 107 fair use factors 
employed by courts today, using Folsom as its guide.” (footnotes omitted)). 
209 Hughes, supra note 109, at 295; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, at 
13.05[A] (“[T]he factors contained in Section 107 are merely by way of example, and are 
not exhaustive enumeration.  This means that factors other than those enumerated may 
prove to have a bearing upon the determination of fair use.”).  For cases involving the 
application of the fair use doctrine to unauthorized electronic use of copyrighted works, 
including unauthorized dissemination on the Internet, see Mtima, supra note 33, at 317–
21. 
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that the works be used in their entirety.  Even the fact that many of 
the copyrighted contributions were journalistic accounts of public 
events would be of only limited benefit to the publishers, as the 
courts have held that such works are not ipso facto vulnerable to 
fair use.210  Finally, while the question of market impact is a 
textured one,211 in light of the findings of the district court and the 
Second Circuit with respect to that issue,212 it would seem prudent 
to abandon fair use in favor of a § 201(c) defensive strategy.213  
On the other hand, in Greenberg, National Geographic did 
pursue a fair use defense in the trial court and before the Eleventh 
Circuit.214  Although the Eleventh Circuit did not employ a point-
by-point analysis of the four fair use factors, its ultimate rejection 
of National Geographic’s fair use defense is consistent with 
traditional fair use analysis.215 
With respect to the first fair use factor, there was no dispute 
that National Geographic’s use of Greenberg’s photograph was for 
commercial profit.216  Moreover, the photograph was not merely 
reproduced in the challenged electronic publication, but was 
actually morphed into a part of the Animation Sequence, a use the 
court easily concluded resulted in the unauthorized creation of a 
derivative work: 
 
210 See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555–58. 
211 As discussed in Part IV.C, defining the “digital re-publication market” for 
contributions to collective works may not be as straightforward a task as it might first 
appear. 
212 Notwithstanding the fact that the district court ruled that Congress had not 
envisioned the development of digital re-publication markets on behalf of contributory 
authors, both courts found that the publishers’ activities were likely to have a detrimental 
impact on such secondary commercial exploitation opportunities. See Tasini v. N.Y. 
Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 826–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d and remanded, 206 F.3d 
161 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); cf. Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 206 F. 3d. 
161, 170 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Time subsequently licensed Whitford’s article to Mead without 
notifying, obtaining authorization from, or compensating, him.”), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 
(2001). 
213 As discussed in Part IV.C, however, the Tasini defendants may have abandoned the 
fair use defense prematurely. 
214 See Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001). 
215 See id. at 1274–75. 
216 See id. at 1275. 
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The Society has selected ten preexisting works, 
photographs included in covers of ten issues of the 
Magazine . . . and transformed them into a moving visual 
sequence that morphs one into the other over a span of 
approximately 25 seconds. . . . The use of [Greenberg’s] 
photograph far transcended a mere reprinting or borrowing 
of the work. . . . [I]t became an integral part of a larger, 
new collective work. . . . The [Animation] Sequence also 
integrates the visual presentation with an audio presentation 
consisting of copyrightable music.  The resultant moving 
and morphing visual creation transcends a use that is fair 
within the context of § 107.217 
Regarding the second and third fair use factors, the photograph 
was an artistic creative work, and the work was used in its 
entirety.218  Each of these attributes generally militates against 
allowing the challenged use as a fair use.219 
Finally, with respect to the fourth fair use factor, the court 
concluded that National Geographic’s use would have a negative 
impact on the subsequent commercial market for Greenberg’s 
photograph.220  Although the court did not cite to any specific 
facts, it expressly held that “the inclusion of Greenberg’s diver 
photograph in the [Animation] Sequence has effectively 
 
217 Id. at 1274–75.  The creation of a derivative work is a separate exclusive right. See 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003).  
218 Cf. id. at 1269 (“One of the cover images used in the moving covers sequence is a 
picture of a diver that was taken by Greenberg in 1961.”). 
219 See Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003) (“We next consider the second 
factor, ‘the nature of the copyrighted work.’  This factor focuses attention on the extent to 
which a work falls at the core of creative expression.  Thus, for example, a fictional work 
might be closer to the core of copyright than a factual work.” (citations omitted)); Sega 
Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992); SunTrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The second factor, the 
nature of the copyrighted work, recognizes that there is a hierarchy of copyright 
protection in which original, creative works are afforded greater protection than 
derivative works or factual compilations.”); Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165, *39 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Regarding the second factor, ‘the nature 
of the copyrighted work,’ the published creative sound recordings copied are ‘close to the 
core of intended copyright protection,’ and, conversely, far removed from the more 
factual or descriptive type of work that is more amenable to fair use.”); Los Angeles 
Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, *54–*60 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
220 See Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1275. 
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diminished, if not extinguished, any opportunity Greenberg might 
have had to license the photograph to other potential users.”221  
Consequently, consistent with the four fair use factors, the court 
ruled that National Geographic’s use did not qualify as a fair 
use.222 
B. Reevaluating Digital Re-Publication Market Impact as a 
Question of Fair Use 
In reviewing the Tasini and Greenberg decisions, it is difficult 
to extract a rule for applying the four fair use factors to 
unauthorized digital re-publication, especially with respect to the 
market impact factor.  As discussed above, the Greenberg fair use 
analysis was somewhat limited, particularly in its market impact 
assessment.223  While the Supreme Court’s market impact analysis 
in Tasini is much more detailed, that analysis was undertaken 
within the context of § 201(c).224  Accordingly, the nature and 
extent of negative market impact resulting from an unauthorized 
digital re-publication that might be allowable as a fair use is 
unclear. 
Initially, it might seem feasible to utilize the finding of 
impermissible market impact by the Supreme Court in Tasini to 
buttress the Greenberg fair use/market impact analysis.  The flaw 
in such an approach, however, is that it fails to distinguish between 
the role of market impact analysis under § 201(c) and its purpose 
in applying the fair use doctrine.  Given the differing policy 
objectives that underlie the revision privilege and the fair use 
doctrine, there may be a level of market impact resulting from an 
unauthorized use that is unacceptable under § 201, but nonetheless 
allowable under § 107.225 
 
221 Id. at 1275.  Thus the court seems to presume both the likelihood of further demand 
for the photograph, as well as a devastating impact on such demand. 
222 See id. at 1274–75. 
223 See id. at 1275. 
224 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 496–97 (2001). 
225 Thus the commentators that have interpreted Tasini to foreclose the fair use defense 
in digital re-publication cases may be premature in their concern. See, e.g., Snyder, supra 
note 67, at 365–66 (“While authors and publishers squared off in [Tasini], the public sat 
on the sidelines.  The protection of public access went out the window in Tasini with 
serious consequences.  Librarians, researchers and archivists were forced to remove 
MTIMA FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:21 PM 
434 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:369 
As construed by the courts in Tasini and Greenberg, the proper 
application of § 201(c) balances the right of a contributing author 
to receive a commercial return for his or her creative endeavors 
against the interest of the publisher who arranged the collective 
work in undertaking—and coincidentally profiting from—
appropriate revisions of that work.226  Congress has determined 
that the publisher’s interest in revising a collective work justifies a 
limited impingement upon the contributing author’s pecuniary 
rights.227  The Tasini and Greenberg courts have clarified, 
however, that the § 201(c) incursion upon the contributing author’s 
exclusive rights is not available for all revisions, but is limited to 
those revisions that, inter alia, do not unduly burden the secondary 
market for contributory works.228  This delineation is necessary to 
 
thousands of newspaper and magazine freelance articles from public access after the 
decisions by the Second Circuit and the United States Supreme Court. . . . By taking the 
side of authors, the Supreme Court rejected the policy of distribution efficiency and 
reached a narrow decision that ignored the broad harms to the authors, publishers and 
public.” (footnotes omitted)).  Of course, the possibility of differing outcomes under  
§ 201(c) and § 107 does not turn solely upon the issue of market impact.  An 
unauthorized re-publication of a collective work which involves changes beyond those 
permitted by § 201(c) might also fail to satisfy the first three fair use factors, even though 
the re-publication may have little or no impact on the secondary market for the 
contributory works therein. 
226 There is also a public interest in having collective works properly updated, which 
provides the impetus for granting publishers the revision privilege. See, e.g., John D. 
Shuff & Geoffrey T. Holtz, Copyright Tensions in a Digital Age, 34 AKRON L. REV. 555, 
556–57 (2001) (“The publisher’s interests are in some ways aligned with and in other 
ways adverse to, both the author’s and the public’s. Like the author, the publisher seeks 
to profit from the sale of the copyrighted works, and thus seeks to limit the means by 
which the public may consume these works without paying a price.  However, like the 
public, the publisher does not want the author’s rights to be so broad that the publisher’s 
ability to reproduce and distribute copyrighted works—and therefore its profitearning 
capability—is hindered.  In a legal dispute, a publisher . . . will thus note the 
constitutional rationalization of the profit motive, but if the author’s and the publisher’s 
interests collide, the latter will likely throw in a ‘value-added’ theory of economic 
analysis that emphasizes dissemination over creation of works and justifies occasionally 
stepping on the author’s toes in the name of efficient distribution of the fruits of ‘Science 
and Useful Arts.’”). 
227 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002). 
228 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73, 1275.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has construed that Congress intended to balance the public interest in 
updated collective works against the copyright holder’s pecuniary interests by limiting 
the revision privilege to revisions that do not devastate the copyright holder’s secondary 
market opportunities. 
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insure that the publisher’s privilege to revise and update a 
collective work is not transmogrified into a usurpation of all post-
publication exploitation opportunities for contributory works.229 
In evaluating fair use claim, however, the interests of the 
unauthorized revising publisher, particularly those of individual 
commercial gain, are all but eliminated from the balancing 
equation—if not weighed against allowing the use.230  Instead, the 
salient interests at stake are those of the public with respect to the 
social utility of creative works versus the compensation 
expectations of the author.231  Given the primacy of the public 
interest, however,232 it is conceivable that the interjection of that 
interest could tip the balance in favor of permitting a detrimental 
impact upon the copyright holder’s commercial interests, 
notwithstanding the fact that such detrimental impact would be 
considered unacceptable in applying § 201(c).233 
 
229 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497. 
230 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Knowing exploitation of a 
copyrighted work for personal gain militates against a finding of fair use.”). 
231 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(“[T]he limited grant [of exclusive rights to authors] is a means by which an important 
public purpose may be achieved.  It is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access 
to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”); 
Samuelson, supra note 146, at 56–57 (“Courts have often relied upon fair use to resolve 
disputes when recognition of broad rights in publishers or authors would have frustrated 
achievement of the societal purposes of copyright law.  In the American tradition, the 
ultimate purpose of copyright is not the maximization of financial rewards to copyright 
owners . . . but fostering the creation and dissemination of literary and artistic works in 
order to enhance the public’s access to knowledge.  The grant of exclusive rights to 
authors enabling them to reap a portion of the value derived from their creative 
contributions is a means to this larger end.” (footnotes omitted)). 
232 See Appel, supra note 119, at 174–75 (“The ultimate purpose of American copyright 
law is plainly stated in the Constitution.  The law exists ‘to promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts’ or, in plain, contemporary English, to promote the 
advancement of society at large.  While the same clause . . . also grants to authors of 
creative works the right to enjoy the financial fruits of their labors, the plain language of 
the clause evidences that this grant of monopoly is subservient to the primary goal of 
promoting the progress of society as a whole.  The Patent and Copyright Clause thus 
reflects a tension between the right of the public to have access to creative works and the 
right of authors of creative works to benefit financially from their efforts.  The plain 
language of the clause, however, resolves this tension in favor of the public.”). 
233 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The challenge of copyright is to strike the ‘difficult balance 
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C. Revisiting Application of the Fair Use Factors to Tasini 
In light of the foregoing, it is possible that some of the 
unauthorized digital re-publications in Tasini might be permitted 
under the fair use doctrine, notwithstanding their disqualification 
as privileged revisions under § 201(c).234  Under the first factor, 
notwithstanding the publishers’ commercial objectives, there is 
also a compelling public interest in digital archiving and 
dissemination that could outweigh the contributing copyright 
holder’s ancillary commercial interests.235  Despite the importance 
 
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their 
writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free 
flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand.’” (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 
429); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(“The Copyright Clause was intended ‘to be the engine of free expression.’ . . . To that 
end, copyright laws have been enacted to achieve the three main goals: the promotion of 
learning, the protection of the public domain, and the granting of an exclusive right to the 
author.” (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558); see also Francesco Parisi & Catherine 
Sevcenko, Lessons from the Anticommons: The Economics of New York Times Co. v. 
Tasini, 90 KY. L.J. 295, 309 (2001/2002) (“Copyright is essentially an attempt to capture 
the benefit that the public derives from a creative literary work . . . and to return that 
benefit to the author as a way to maintain an incentive for people to make cultural 
contributions.  It is not designed to guarantee the highest remuneration to authors, but is 
rather a mechanism for balancing between the need for broad public availability of art, 
literature, and music and finding a way to create incentives for people to produce those 
goods.” (footnotes omitted)). 
234 Leval, supra note 106, at 1125 (“Not every type of market impairment opposes fair 
use.”). 
235 Ho, supra note 152, at 1573 (“The legal nuances attendant to fair uses in teaching 
and research are far more complex.  Court precedents have banished simplistic 
assumptions, such as the mythic fair use assumption that all commercial use is 
impermissible.”); Koons, 960 F.2d at 309 (“The first factor . . . asks whether the [work 
was used] in good faith to benefit the public or primarily for the commercial interests of 
the infringer.”); Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, *41 
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (“In addition to examining defendants’ purpose in copying plaintiffs’ 
articles, the first fair use factor also directs that the court evaluate the ‘character’ of the 
use.  The mere fact that a use is commercial does not ‘give rise to a presumption of 
unfairness.’  Rather, a defendant’s commercial purpose is only ‘a separate factor that 
tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.’” (citations omitted)); see also Rose, supra 
note 119, at 110–11 (“Copyright law can reward authors with certain exclusive rights to 
information placed on the Internet, but cannot enforce these rights to the exclusion of 
equal access.  The Web facilitates global communication.  Global communication in turn 
enhances global knowledge.  Having a broad base of technological expertise strengthens 
the United States both socially and economically.  Thus, to remain true to the 
Constitution, intellectual property law must harmonize itself with the moral obligation of 
public schools and libraries to provide uniform access to digital information.”); Parisi & 
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of the author’s remunerative rights, ensuring digital dissemination 
of previously published printed works provides a vital public 
benefit.236 
 
Sevcenko, supra note 233, at 295 (“The [Tasini] case . . . attracted media attention . . . 
because it appeared to pit the rights of authors to protect their creative works against the 
nation’s need to preserve its historical record.”); see generally Carla D. Pratt, Should 
Klansmen Be Lawyers?  Racism as an Ethical Barrier to the Legal Profession, 30 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 857, 874 (2003) (“Communitarianism is perhaps the most rational 
mechanism for reconciling the competing interests of civil liberties and civil rights.  
Communitarians believe that, in a rights-based society, rights have limits as well as 
concomitant responsibilities.  Underlying the theory of communitarianism is the idea that, 
as members of a community, we are morally obligated to undertake certain 
responsibilities, and that these responsibilities may exist without an imminent payback in 
the form of rights.  In other words, communitarianists recognize that individual rights 
cannot be absolute, but must be tempered by that which is in the best interest of the 
community.” (footnotes omitted)). 
236 See Joanne Benoit Nakos, An Analysis of the Effect of New Technology on the Rights 
Conveyed by Copyright License Agreements, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 433, 459–60 (1995) 
(“Exploitation of old works through new technology has the potential for such 
profitability that media industries are not likely to find the possible threat of infringement 
litigation a deterrent.  Pursuant to the goals of copyright policy, such industries should be 
facilitated in their legitimately licensed use of classic works . . . . [However, i]t is 
extremely difficult for organizations with the ability to exploit classic works through the 
‘information superhighway’ to search out outstanding copyright licenses, especially 
considering the number of works that may constitute components of the final 
transmission.  In addition, these organization must secure their own license for this new 
use, the rights to which were, in all likelihood, not contemplated by any preexisting 
license.”); Snyder, supra note 67, at 377 (“Opponents have said publishers should not 
receive the windfall from these new income sources.  However, this income is just as 
much of a windfall for the writer who fifteen years ago could have had no real 
expectation that his article would produce income from an internet or CD-ROM database.  
When income is not earned or reasonably expected by an author, the windfall should be 
given to publishers or distributors to encourage greater availability of works to the 
public.” (footnotes omitted)); Colby B. Springer, Ownership of Electronic Publishing 
Rights in Collective Works: New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 341, 341 (2002) (“[The Tasini decision] represents a potentially 
colossal financial windfall for freelance authors, while throwing a time consuming and 
costly wrench into the gears of the multi-million dollar business that is on-line periodical 
storage and retrieval.”).  These considerations also render unauthorized digital re-
publication closer in nature to the unauthorized uses at issue in Sony, 464 U.S. at  423, 
and Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia System Inc., 180 
F.3d 1072, 1073–75 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding denial of preliminary injunctions against 
a company that produced portable music players that could play music downloaded from 
the internet), than to the unauthorized uses in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. 
Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  In Tasini, Sony, and Diamond, the primary purpose 
and benefit of each unauthorized use is arguably that of space-shifting and/or archiving, 
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If NEXIS or some similar online database has become the 
predominant digital archive for previously published material, the 
public interest in complete digital libraries, when weighed against 
the transaction costs in locating and negotiating with every 
contributing author, seems to tip the balance in favor of allowing 
digital re-publication as a fair use.237  Accepting the alternative—
conceding absolute dominion over digital re-publication to 
individual freelance authors—could impede the ultimate objectives 
of the copyright law.238 
 
whereas the primary purpose of the unauthorized uses in Napster and MP3.com is that of 
distribution, with a concomitant impact upon the commercial market for the copyrighted 
works. See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.  Although digital re-publication also has 
distribution characteristics, as discussed below, the absence of a genuine electronic 
publication market for individual contributory works, combined with the public benefit 
derived from digital re-publication, distinguishes digital re-publication from unauthorized 
peer-to-peer online music distribution for the purpose of assessing fair use. 
237 See Garon, supra note 121, at 1350–51 (“The Internet will replace the paper file and 
the fax as the document repository and transfer mechanism.  Offices will not be 
paperless, but most official files will be stored in digital archives.”); Thornburg, supra 
note 2, at 247 (“Publishers argue that their development of new electronic formats serves 
the public good in providing access through the Internet as well as other formats, like 
CD-ROMs and databases.  Creating a variety of both traditional and electronic 
formats . . . allows greater access and ability to search for information, which directly 
aids academics, researchers, and students.  Furthermore, unlike traditional formats that 
are bulky, the development of alternative electronic media has allowed for the ease of 
storage and greater ability to retrieve such information.  Both computer databases and 
CD-ROMs serve the same public function as regular print periodicals, as these are all 
sources of information selected and arranged to form valuable compilations by 
publishers.” (footnotes omitted)).  The problem of locating freelance authors, however, 
could stymie this technological evolution. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 
519 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he difficulties of locating individual freelance authors 
and the potential of exposure to statutory damages may well have the effect of forcing 
electronic archives to purge freelance pieces from their databases.  ‘The omission of these 
materials from electronic collections . . . undermines the principal benefits that electronic 
archives offer historians – efficiency, accuracy and comprehensiveness.’” (footnote and 
citation omitted)); Parisi & Sevcenko, supra note 233, at 297, 300 (“[The Tasini case] is, 
from the law and economic perspective, a classic anticommons situation in which 
asymmetric transaction costs are complicating the implementation of the easiest solution: 
some form of retroactive compensation to the authors for use of their work. . . . [T]he 
core of the problem is that the New York Times does not have an easy way to track down 
the freelancers who contributed to the paper over the last ten to fifteen years and 
renegotiate the terms of the article with each of them.”). 
238 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing in the Contemporary Information Economy, 8 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y  99, 145 (2002) (hereinafter Nimmer, Licensing) (“A person who 
controls information may elect not to distribute the information . . . . Unless mandatory 
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With regard to the second fair use factor, because the 
contributory works in Tasini were primarily journalistic accounts 
of factual events, the balance tends to weigh in favor of allowing 
the use.239  Further, given the nature and purpose of digital re-
publication, it is necessary that the entire work be used, and hence 
the third factor is not afforded the same weight as in cases in which 
the relevant social utilities can be achieved by allowing only a 
partial use of the work.240 
Finally, in so far as the fourth fair use factor is concerned, 
notwithstanding the findings in Tasini and Greenberg, the 
 
disclosure laws govern, the law protects that decision.”); Jaszi, supra note 130, at 300 
(“Copyright is changing or is in the process of changing. . . . [A]s things stand now, the 
network environment is at risk of being swept up in a general restructuring of American 
copyright law which has been taking place, . . . over the past few years.  This process, to 
begin with, had little if anything to do with new information technology, but it now 
threatens to prevent that technology from achieving its full cultural and economic 
potential.”); Parisi & Sevcenko, supra note 233, at 310–11 (“In an anticommons 
situation, multiple owners have veto powers over the use of a resource, thereby 
increasing the chances that it will not be used.  Competition among the owners prompts 
exercise of exclusion rights, even if one party could use the resource to create social 
benefits. . . . The anticommons application in Tasini is clear: each of the authors now 
retains control over the copyright to the work that was published in the New York Times.  
The paper is currently either unwilling, or unable, to negotiate with each one of these 
writers for the rights, so that the information they have provided will no longer be readily 
available in electronic format.  An important resource, therefore, will be underutilized, 
given the growing reliance that people are placing on immediate electronic access to 
information.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Springer, supra note 236, at 351–52 (“[T]he 
Supreme Court’s decision in [Tasini] may very well punch holes in the fabric of history, 
as electronic databases are the apparent future of our literary archives.  Not only do these 
databases provide a streamlined approach to research, and an easily accessible medium in 
which authors may promote their works, electronic databases also provide a safe and 
economical means by which to archive literary works.  Electronic databases, while 
unlikely to replace print libraries altogether, are quickly becoming more comprehensive 
than their paper-bound brethren.  The Tasini decision may only curtail this progress.”). 
239 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 310 (“Where the original work is factual rather than fictional 
the scope of fair use is broader.”); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. 
Supp. 1522, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Anderson & Brown, supra note 111, at 168–
69; Edwards, supra note 159, at 849; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The 
Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 501 (1991) [hereinafter Jaszi, 
Toward a Theory of Copyright] (“[I]n light of the Romantic ‘authorship’ construct, with 
its implicit recognition of a hierarchy of artistic productions . . . art contains greater value 
if it results from true imagination rather than mere application, particularly if its creator 
draws inspiration directly from nature.”). 
240 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,  586–89 (1994); Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984). 
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existence or extent of stand-alone digital re-publication markets241 
for individual contributory works remains debatable.  Prior to the 
development and proliferation of digital information technology, 
the market for re-publication of contributory works was limited,242 
with the possible exception of the demand for works of famous 
authors and freelance writers.  The advent of digital information 
technology, however, does not create any actual new demand for 
individual contributory works.  As Justice Stevens argued in his 
dissent in Tasini, the advent of digital databases has created a new 
market for the digital re-publication of complete archives of well-
known periodical publications and similar collective works: 
[E]ven if one accepts the . . . characterization of the 
Electronic Databases as collections of freestanding articles, 
demand for databases like NEXIS probably does not reflect 
a “demand for a freelance article standing alone[]” . . . . 
Instead, it seems far more likely that the demand for the 
Electronic Databases reflects demand for a product that will 
provide a user with the means to quickly search through 
scores of complete periodicals. . . . 
Users . . . do not go to NEXIS because it contains a score of 
individual articles by Jonathan Tasini.  Rather, they go to 
NEXIS because it contains a comprehensive and easily 
searchable collection of (intact) periodicals.  (“The 
efficiency, accuracy, reliability, comprehensiveness and 
immediacy of access offered by searchable full-text digital 
archives are but a few of the benefits historians and other 
researchers have reaped from the advancement in the 
technology of information”).243 
 
241 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497 (“If there is a demand for a freelance article standing 
alone or in a new collection, the Copyright Act allows the freelancer to benefit from that 
demand . . . (‘when an author produces a work which later commands a higher price in 
the market than the original bargain provided, the copyright statute . . . is designed to 
provide the author the power to negotiate for the realized value of the work’) . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). 
242 See Shuff & Holtz, supra note 226, at 559. 
243 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 522–24 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Parisi & Sevcenko, 
supra note 233, at 311–12 (“A database’s worth . . . lies in the fact that it is 
comprehensive.  Writers would know this and therefore demand premium licensing 
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It is likely that few if any of the contributory articles in many 
popular collective works have any digital re-publication market 
beyond their role in making a digital archive complete.244  A 
reasonable argument can be made that in the case of an online 
database such as NEXIS, the objective is not to re-publish the 
individual articles found within collective works, but rather, to 
compile digital archives of collective works that are complete, 
without regard to whatever specific contributory articles the 
digitized collective works might happen to contain.245 
If there is no genuine stand-alone market for digital re-
publication of certain contributory articles, then the fourth fair use 
factor weighs in favor of allowing digital re-publication of those 
articles as part of the collective works in which they appear, lest 
the public interest in digital archives be denied to preserve an 
illusory interest on the part of freelance copyright holders. 
Under [the fourth factor] a balance must be struck between 
the benefit gained by the copyright owner when the [use] is 
found [to be] an unfair use and the benefit gained by the 
 
compensation, knowing that electronic database services . . . would have to comply in 
order to maintain their market value.”). 
244 Indeed, disallowing digital re-publication/archiving seems more likely to deprive the 
public of electronic access to freelance contributory works than it is to force the issue of 
royalties for freelance writers. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 67, at 378 (“After Tasini, 
authors will possess less bargaining power.  Publishers will be cautious of buying stories 
in which they have only limited rights since new technology for information distribution 
constantly develops.  Publishers will likely ask for a prospective author to sign all of his 
rights away, leaving him with the same amount of rights enjoyed in the early part of the 
last century: none.”); Andrew Albanese, Despite Discord, Aggregators Remain Upbeat 
After Tasini, LIBR. J., Aug. 1, 2001, at 14 (“‘The Times’s action creates the blacklist of 
the Internet age,’ [Jonathan] Tasini said.  ‘. . . No one who tries to enforce the Supreme 
Court’s decision will be able to write for the Times ever again.  That’s a blacklist.’”); 
Reed, supra note 56, at 1089–90 (“Publishers . . . see [Tasini as] creating a lose-lose 
scenario for all parties.  In order to stop the infringement, the publishers are removing 
those writers’ articles from the electronic databases, thereby taking those writers’ works 
out of the public eye and also weakening the integrity of those databases as complete 
records.  The alternative is to go back through twenty years of articles, identify all of the 
freelancer articles, contact the writers and have them all sign copyright transfers, a task 
that many see as simply impossible to complete in any thorough fashion.”). 
245 Thus, an electronic archive of “random freelance articles previously published in The 
New York Times,” or for that matter, “all staff-written articles previously published in The 
New York Times” is of limited value.  The value of any database stems from the fact that 
it is comprehensive and complete, whatever its specific content. 
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public when the use is held to be fair.  The less adverse 
impact on the owner, the less public benefit need be shown 
to sustain non-commercial fair use.  It is plain that where a 
use has no demonstrable impact on a copyright owner[‘s] 
potential market, the use need not be prohibited to protect 
the artist’s incentive to pursue his inventive skills.246 
As an equitable doctrine, fair use has yet to be definitively 
explored in the digital information context.247  Given the important 
public interest at stake and the significance of market impact as a 
fair use factor,248 genuine market impact in connection with 
unauthorized digital re-publication should be concretely 
established.  Regardless of whether dispersing contributory works 
into a digital database results in their individual re-publication and 
distribution or merely a digital archive version of the original 
collective work, there in fact may be little or no digital market for 
the contributory works on a stand-alone basis, and therefore no 
 
246 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311–12 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Greenberg v. Nat’l 
Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1272 (stating that the absence of any genuine stand-
alone secondary digital market may also militate against finding in favor of contributory 
authors under § 201.  However, given the nature of the competing interests at issue under 
§ 201—i.e., publisher versus Author—any doubts as to the extent of such stand-alone 
markets should be resolved in favor of the copyright holders.  “[T]he [copyright] statute’s 
language contrasts the contributor’s ‘copyright’ and ‘any rights under it’ with the 
publisher’s ‘privilege.’  This is an important distinction that militates in favor of narrowly 
construing the publisher’s privilege when balancing it against the constitutionally-secured 
rights of the author/contributor.”). 
247 See generally Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 
(1985) (“‘[Since] the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable 
definition is possible, and each case raising the question [of fair use] must be decided on 
its own facts.’” (citation omitted)); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984) (“[S]ection [107] identifies various factors that enable a 
court to apply an ‘equitable rule of reason’ analysis to particular claims of 
infringement.”); Samuelson, supra note 146.  As discussed above, a key policy issue is 
determining the most propitious application for the revenues derived from digital re-
publication.  Arguably if such revenues are directed toward the publishers, it will likely 
insure digital re-publication, in that publishers have control over and access to the entire 
content of the original collective works.  If the revenue is directed to the contributing 
authors, it may enhance authors’ exclusive rights and further support the objectives 
underlying § 201, but it may not prove an effective means by which to assure digital 
archiving, given the transaction costs in locating and obtaining permission from each 
author. 
248 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002). 
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genuine issue of negative market impact for purposes of fair use.  
Thus, notwithstanding the decision in Greenberg249 or the findings 
in Tasini, fair use remains a viable defense for many unauthorized, 
collective-work digital re-publications.250 
V. DIGITAL RE-PUBLICATION, PUBLISHING TRADE PRACTICES,  
AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
In Parts III and IV, the legitimacy of unauthorized digital re-
publication was analyzed in the context of copyright infringement 
 
249 See Greenberg, 244 F.3d 1267.  The situation in Greenberg remains distinguishable.  
Whatever the public interest in the digital production of the National Geographic Replica 
(arguably an archive version), there does not appear to be any compelling public interest 
in the unauthorized use of Greenberg’s photograph, an artistic work, in the production of 
the Animation Sequence, a new and derivative work.  Thus, even without exhaustive 
evidence of negative market impact, the balance weighs in favor of disallowing the 
unauthorized use. 
250 See Jaszi, supra note 130, at 300–01 (“[C]opyright should operate to assure the 
existence of a robust, constantly replenished public domain—an informational commons 
on which we are all free to draw in our research and teaching, and for our various creative 
projects.  Accordingly, the special structures of copyright doctrine which exist to assure a 
reasonable level of public access even where copyrighted works are concerned, such as 
the doctrine of fair use, should be preserved and nurtured.” (footnotes omitted)); Parisi & 
Sevcenko, supra note 233, at 323 (“The tragedy of the anticommons demonstrates that 
fair use remains valuable even in the digital context of automated rights management. . . . 
In light of the anticommons insight, fair use doctrine retains a valid efficiency 
justification even in a zero transaction cost environment.  Fair use defenses can be 
regarded as justifiable and instrumental in minimizing the welfare losses occasioned by 
the strategic behavior of the copyright holders.” (footnotes omitted)); Samuelson, supra 
note 146, at 116 (“When enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress expressed an 
expectation that the fair-use doctrine would—and should—evolve to deal with 
challenging questions concerning the application of copyright law posed by new 
technologies. . . . The strict property-rights view of copyright . . . was rejected by the 
Court, which instead seemed to view copyright law as more of a regulatory regime aimed 
at achieving a balance among the interests of copyright owners, the consuming public and 
other commercial participants in the marketplace, such that the rights granted to authors 
under the statute should be construed as reaching no further than Congress has intended 
to achieve this balance.”); Shuff & Holtz, supra note 226, at 566 (“The question remains 
of how best to ensure that the vast library of individual articles that have been published 
remains available to the public while the rights of the authors of these articles is [sic] 
respected.  After all, if distribution of these articles is halted altogether, the authors will 
enjoy no benefit, and the public will certainly suffer.  Is requiring prior permission from 
each author feasible? . . . The transaction costs of obtaining such [permission] could 
outweigh the technological advances that have allowed millions of such articles to be 
made available and economically sold on an individual basis in the first place.”). 
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defenses that permit the use of copyrighted material without the 
copyright holder’s consent.  In many cases, however, there may be 
a legitimate dispute as to whether the user has a contractual right to 
make use of the subject work in electronic media.251  In such cases, 
it will be necessary to scrutinize the terms of any agreements 
between the parties, in order to determine whether the copyright 
holder has licensed digital re-publication and other electronic 
media use of his or her work. 
A. Licensing Electronic Use, Establishing Electronic Infringement 
Although the copyright law bestows the exclusive rights upon 
the author of the copyrighted work, § 201 of the Copyright Act 
provides that “[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a 
copyright, including any subdivision of the rights specified by 
section 106, may be transferred . . . and owned separately.”252  In 
addition, § 204 requires that assignments and transfers be made in 
writing.253  Thus, the copyright holder is free to transfer or license 
some, all, or any part of his or her exclusive rights, by executing an 
appropriate license agreement.254 
Unfortunately, participants in the publishing industry typically 
do not effectuate or memorialize their copyright licenses and 
agreements in terms that mirror the enumeration of exclusive rights 
in § 106, or for that matter, through contractual mechanisms that 
ostensibly comply with § 201.255  License agreements between 
publishers and authors are often quite informal, indeed even 
 
251 See, e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 617 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
252 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2002); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, §§ 10.01, 10.02. 
253 See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).  “A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation 
of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the 
transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s 
duly authorized agent.” See id. 
254 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). 
255 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors as “Licensors” of “Informational Rights” 
Under U.C.C. Article 2B, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 949–54 (1998); Santelli, supra 
note 7, at 278; Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don’t Put My Article Online!: 
Extending Copyright’s New-Use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and 
Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 906 (1995). 
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oral.256  And even when in writing, standard publishing agreements 
typically reference terms and rights that have specific and 
significant meanings in the publishing trade, such as the right to 
“publish” or to “print” a work, but which are not set forth as 
exclusive rights in the copyright statute, such as the right to 
reproduce, distribute, and prepare derivative versions of a 
copyrighted work.257 
Given some of the licensing jargon in the publishing trade, 
even in those instances in which the parties intend to license a 
particular kind of conduct or even specific exclusive rights, it is not 
 
256 See generally Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 
2001); Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d and 
remanded, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Mellencamp v. Riva 
Music Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154, 1161–67 (S.D.N.Y 1988) Ginsburg, supra note 253, at 
954 n.41; Matthew Hoff, Tasini v. New York Times: What the Second Circuit Didn’t 
Say, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 125, 128 (1999) (stating that “publishers . . . once 
accepted a freelance author’s work on little more than a handshake”); Rosenzweig, supra 
note 255, at 905–06 (“Although publishers ordinarily have the rights to use preexisting 
content produced by their staff writers under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, the usage 
of works by freelancers is subject solely to interpretation of the underlying contract 
between the two parties.  Historically, however, parties have been lax in creating written, 
let alone unambiguous, contracts.  Until recently, magazines and newspapers bought 
articles ‘simply on the basis of oral agreements,’ and the freelance contracts that did exist 
did not expressly address the parties’ rights in electronic media.” (footnotes omitted)). 
257 See, e.g., Reed, supra note 56, at 1106–08 (“An ‘all-rights’ contract does what it 
says; it transfers to the publisher every possible right the author may have in her 
work. . . . [By contrast t]he book publishing industry [also] recognizes the concept of  
‘Primary Rights,’ which, in the United States, generally entails the exclusive right to 
publish a work in print in English throughout North America (or even worldwide).  The 
analogous right in the periodical publishing industry may be the ‘first publication rights,’ 
which give the periodical publisher the right to publish the work in their publication 
before it is published elsewhere. . . . Subsidiary Rights are the rights that are not Primary 
Rights.  As evidenced in Random House, obtaining the Primary Rights to publish a book 
in print does not necessarily include the right to publish that book electronically.”).  In 
addition to the foregoing categories, other “rights” recognized in the publishing industry, 
but not individually enumerated in the copyright statute, include Serial Rights, Reprint 
Rights, Braille Rights, Audio Rights, Foreign Language Rights, Anthology Rights, and 
Book Club Rights. See id. at 1108; see also Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1387 (1st 
Cir. 1993); Nakos, supra note 236, at 433–49; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 
26.02; Thornburg, supra note 2, at 251; cf. generally Tele-pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 570 
N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that broadcast rights for motion pictures do 
not confer rights to distribute videocassettes); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 
F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 150–53 
(2d Cir. 1968) (upholding dismissal of the copyright holder’s claim against the assignee 
of rights to the motion picture which licensed the movie rights for television). 
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always apparent from the express terms of the parties’ contract 
which exclusive rights are being licensed or the scope of the 
license conferred.258  Consequently, precisely which of the 
copyright holder’s exclusive rights are being licensed or assigned, 
and whether there are qualitative, durational, geographic, and/or 
media restrictions limiting the grant of exclusive rights, are often 
difficult to ascertain from the express terms of the parties’ 
agreement.259  In the face of a claim of a contractual right to 
engage in a particular use of a copyrighted work, the court is 
typically required to not only confirm the existence of the claimed 
license, but also to define its scope.260 
Tasini, Random House, and similar cases illustrate how some 
of the license interpretation problems that arise in connection with 
digital re-publication and other new technological uses for 
copyrighted works are only partially the result of rapid 
technological development.  The question of precisely which 
exclusive rights were encompassed within the parties’ license 
agreements was one of the principal issues raised in Tasini.261  
While the plaintiff freelance writers essentially conceded that their 
agreements licensed the exclusive rights of reproduction and 
distribution, they contended that the agreements did not license the 
exclusive right of display, more specifically, the right to display 
 
258 See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 
485–88 (2d Cir. 1998); Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 152–54; Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta 
Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 
2002); Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 53, § 26.02 [B] (“[A] grant of the right to ‘reproduce the work in all 
media now known or hereafter developed’ does not necessarily include the right to 
distribute, exhibit, or perform the work (which are separate rights under copyright law) in 
all future media.”). 
259 See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 485–88; Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 152–54; 
Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 621; Field, 89 F. Supp. at 614; cf. NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 53, § 10.14 [C] (discussing difficulties with the term “book form”). 
260 See Nimmer, Licensing, supra note 238, at 119–22 (“A license is a contract.  Its 
subject matter is information and rights in information.  The contract gives rights to a 
licensee to use information or resources that the licensor controls or to which it controls 
access.  License agreements also often cover issues concerning the quality, availability, 
and use of the information. . . . [T]he main function of the license centers on permissions 
or agreements associated with the use of or access to informational assets, along with a 
licensee’s promise not to exceed agreed limitations on use.”). 
261 See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 806–08. 
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their works on a computer screen.262  Consequently, in part 
because the parties’ agreements were not cast in terms of the 
exclusive rights, the Tasini tribunals were confronted with a 
bifurcated issue of statutory construction and license interpretation.  
First, the courts had to decide whether the copyright holder’s 
exclusive right of display extends to computer screen display, and 
if so, whether the parties’ license agreements extended to the 
display right, as it apparently extended to the rights of reproduction 
and distribution.263 
Inconsistencies between publishing trade licensing practices 
and the express provisions of the copyright statute were at the very 
heart of the controversy in Random House.264  Instead of casting 
 
262 See id. at 808.  Numerous courts have previously wrestled with the question of 
whether computer screen display is conduct within the exclusive display right, with 
differing results. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 
(9th Cir. 1993); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Cal. 1996); 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15454, *2–*5 (E.D. Va. 1996); 
Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556–57 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (“The concept of 
display . . . covers ‘the projection of an image on a screen or other surface by any 
method, the transmission of an image by electronic or other means, and the showing of an 
image on a cathode ray tube, or similar viewing apparatus . . . .’  The display right 
precludes unauthorized transmission of the display from one place to another, for 
example, by a computer system.” (citations omitted)); State v. Perry, 697 N.E.2d 624, 
628 (Ohio 1998) (“Posting software on a bulletin board where others can access and 
download it is distribution.  Unauthorized distribution is a use which is governed by the 
copyright laws.  Unauthorized posting may also be viewed as facilitating unauthorized 
downloading or copying by a third party and as such is also a violation of the exclusive 
right of reproduction under the copyright laws.  Posting also implicates the display rights 
of copyright owners.” (citations omitted)). 
263 Both questions were implicated because even if the subject agreements do not license 
the display right, plaintiffs must still demonstrate that the display right has been infringed 
in order to establish copyright infringement.  Once the publishers failed to assert their 
license agreements in defense of their digital re-publications, however, they effectively 
conceded that they had no authorization to engage in any of the exclusive rights, be it that 
of display, or those of reproduction and distribution.  Consequently, once the Court ruled 
the § 201(c) privilege inapplicable, there was no question that the publishers had at least 
infringed upon plaintiffs’ reproduction and distribution rights.  “Satisfied that the 
Publishers exercised rights § 106 initially assigns exclusively to the Author, we need 
resolve no more on that score.  Thus, we do not reach [the question as to whether] the 
Databases publicly ‘display’ the Articles . . . .” N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 
498 n.8 (2001).  Whether the publishers had also impinged upon the display right was 
rendered surplusage—the case for copyright infringement had already been made. 
264 Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 619–22 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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their agreements in terms of the exclusive rights, the parties 
executed written licenses that authorized the publisher to “to print, 
publish and sell” the subject works and to do so “in book form.”265  
Consequently, there were legitimate issues not only as to which 
exclusive rights were licensed by the agreements, but also as to the 
scope of the grants—i.e., the meaning of “in book form.”266 
Thus, the perennial failure of the publishing trade to harmonize 
its licensing terms and practices with the express provisions of the 
copyright statute renders legal disputes and maneuverings such as 
those that occurred in Tasini, Random House, and similar cases 
inevitable.267  In a dispute over the right to engage in a new 
technological use, both licensor and licensee genuinely may 
believe that the right belongs to him or her.  Moreover, because 
publishing licenses typically make no reference to the enumerated 
exclusive rights, which are the only uses of copyrighted material 
that the copyright holder can legally control, the courts have little 
guidance as to which of the copyright holder’s actual property 
rights are the subject of the agreements.268  When a dispute arises 
 
265 See id. at 614. 
266 See id. at 620.  The parties might also have litigated the issue as to whether the 
display right is included in a license “to print, publish and sell.”  Instead, the litigation 
focused on deciphering the meaning of the trade term “in book form” and whether an 
“ebook” is a work “in book form.” See id. 
267 See Springer, supra note 236, at 352 (“While a written agreement can easily be 
drafted using a fill-in-the-blanks form, recall that the freelance publishing industry has 
been one based on traditions and handshakes.”); Vermylen, supra note 92, at 192 (“The 
business of publishing books has historically been slow moving, driven more by 
relationships and passion for the process than by bottom lines.  Liberal arts majors, 
literature students, and generalists of all sorts seek jobs in the industry in part for this 
reason—books do not change and the business of making them changes only 
begrudgingly.”). 
268 For an excellent review of the various judicial approaches to new use disputes, see 
Nakos, supra note 236, at 443–55, which discusses the predominant methods for 
resolving such disputes, particularly the “preferred” and “strict” approaches.  Under the 
preferred approach, the new use is deemed to be within the scope of the license if it can 
be reasonably construed to fall within the stated description of the explicitly licensed 
activity. See id. at 444.  Under the strict approach, only uses specifically provided for in 
the express license terms are deemed within the scope of the license. See id. at 446. 
Problems accompany either the preferred or strict approach . . . and arguments 
have been made that each theory puts one party in an unfair position.  One 
problem lies in ascertaining the definition of the medium or mediums described 
in the license, because a use may simply constitute an improvement on a 
previous medium rather than an entirely new means of exploitation . . . . This 
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in connection with a new technological use, courts are therefore 
limited in determining the intent or reasonable expectations of the 
parties, not only as a question of basic contract interpretation, but 
as an issue of substantive copyright as well.269 
B. Emphasizing Exclusive Rights in Drafting and Interpreting 
Copyright Licenses 
The problem of construing pre-existing license terms in light of 
new technological applications for copyrighted works is to some 
extent inescapable.270  No matter how carefully drafted, virtually 
every license is vulnerable to ongoing technological development 
and the consequential dilemma of determining which party has the 
right to engage in a use or application that did not exist when the 
license was executed.271 
 
situation  is especially problematic when applying the preferred approach 
because the licensor’s carefully drafted, narrow, and unambiguous grant may 
later become ambiguous in light of advanced technology. 
Id. at 448–49 (footnotes omitted). 
269 See id. at 435–36 (“[An important] issue [in publishing license disputes] is what uses 
are covered by the rights transferred to the licensee when the license agreement does not 
cover all possible contingencies, such as the invention of a new mode of presenting the 
work or making the work available to the public.  The problem is particularly perplexing 
because the area is one where no controlling law is available to aid in placing the rights 
with whom they belong.  Courts have diverged in their attempts to resolve the situation 
using basic contract interpretation principles as well as copyright policy; as a result, no 
universally adopted rule has emerged.”); see generally Rosenzweig, supra note 255 
(suggesting that courts should generally interpret contracts to grant rights to publishers to 
exploit future technologies, because the publishers can best exploit the new 
technologies). 
270 See Nakos, supra note 236, at 434 (“[These] dispute[s] inevitably arise[] whenever a 
new use for a certain work is developed or invented subsequent to the execution of the 
license agreement.  Licensees argue that the new use is contained in the definition of a 
medium in the agreement.  But licensors . . . counter that a new use could not be 
contemplated by such an agreement.  Because the use of the work did not exist at the time 
the license agreement was drafted, courts must resolve the issue of to whom new uses 
belong.”). 
271 See id. at 436 (“[Disputes over the scope of the license have] repeatedly occurred 
with the invention of popular new mediums.  The resulting issues include the 
following: . . . whether broadcasting rights include television when only radio existed at 
the time of contracting, whether motion picture rights include rights to televise, whether 
television and movie rights include videocassette distribution rights, and, currently, 
whether the right to publish a book includes the right to make books on tape or transfer 
the contents on-line.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Although it may be impossible to compose license terms that 
will account for every new technological use, the problem can be 
mitigated through the use of consistent terminology and rules of 
interpretation in the drafting and judicial construction of copyright 
licenses.272  As discussed in Part II, whatever the particular use to 
which a copyrighted work is to be put, that use can only be 
precluded, restricted, or for that matter, effectively licensed by the 
copyright holder if it involves an exclusive right.273  Consequently, 
even if a license unambiguously sanctions a specific use of 
copyrighted material274 as a matter of the copyright law, the license 
will be ambiguous as to the extent to which the copyright holder 
can restrict or limit the activities of his or her licensee.275 
Unless the grant of rights is described in terms of the exclusive 
rights, the scope of the licensee’s ability to engage even in a 
 
272 See Thornburg, supra note 2, at 255 (“[C]ontract law remains the sole mechanism to 
bring both freelance authors and publishers to a common ground to create the exchange 
of electronic rights for appropriate compensation.  The traditional handshake agreements 
between these parties have come to an abrupt end, with contract negotiations serving 
society’s interest in promoting and encouraging freelance creations to enrich our cultural 
needs.”). 
273 See supra Part II. 
274 This may include a license to publish a written work in digital format, if the license 
is not equally specific with respect to the attendant exclusive rights—that is, explicitly 
referencing the rights of reproduction and distribution (and possibly the right of display). 
275 See, e.g., Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(“Perhaps the primary reason why the words ‘exhibition by means of television’ in the 
license cannot be construed as including the distribution of videocassettes for home 
viewing is that VCRs for home use were not invented or known in 1969, when the license 
was executed. . . . [T]he original licensee could not have bargained for, or paid for, the 
rights associated with videocassette distribution. . . . [T]he license reserved to the grantor 
‘all rights and uses in and to said musical composition, except those herein granted to the 
licensee . . .’  This language operates to preclude uses not then known to, or contemplated 
by the parties.” (citations omitted)); Rose, supra note 119, at 95 (“A critical issue for 
Internet transmissions is whether they constitute ‘reproductions,’ ‘distributions,’ or both.  
The original electronic file is typically not erased when a copy is transmitted.  Because 
the original from which the copy is generated remains intact, Internet communications 
arguably infringe both reproduction and distribution rights.  Indeed, for bulletin board or 
website operators the query remains whether downloading from a bulletin board or 
website is a ‘reproduction’ by the Internet user, or merely a ‘distribution’ by the 
operator.” (footnotes omitted)); Vermylen, supra note 92, at 198 (“[E]ven in the age of 
the e-book, it seems that the definition of ‘book’ is limited.  As the [Random House] 
court concluded, the rights to the content of a work itself are independent of the right to 
publish it in a given form.”). 
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specifically designated activity will be unclear, especially when 
new technological uses are introduced.  If the parties cast their 
agreements in terms of the exclusive rights, however, when 
confronted with a new technological use dispute, the parties and 
the courts will have a concrete point of reference from which to 
undertake the copyright allocation analysis: a comparison of the 
new technological use with the exclusive rights expressly 
referenced in the parties’ license agreement. 
An “exclusive rights emphasis” would therefore require that 
copyright licenses be expressed in terms of the enumerated 
exclusive rights, and the presence or absence of such express terms 
would be subject to uniform rules of construction.  In this way, the 
expression of a copyright license in terms of the exclusive rights 
will provide greater certainty for the parties thereto and concrete 
guidance for the courts when confronted with the problem of 
allocating a new technological application for copyrighted 
material. 
Participants in the publishing trade could be encouraged to 
adopt an exclusive rights emphasis in their drafting practices if 
courts begin to interpret the inclusion or omission of exclusive 
rights terms in a consistent manner.276  Both licensors and 
licensees would soon realize that the use of exclusive rights 
terminology would lead to predictable judicial construction of their 
agreements.  This would not only result in routine reference to the 
exclusive rights in publishing licenses, but would also engender the 
 
276 Reconstructing legal canons and mechanisms to address actual trade or market 
conditions is by no means a new idea. See, e.g., Steven D. Jamar, A Lawyering Approach 
to Law and Development, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 31, 33–34 (2001) (“[A 
lawyering] approach to law and development . . . relies not upon an arcane sociological 
theory, but rather upon the lawyer’s consummate practical skill of problem-solving.  The 
lawyering approach involves professionalism, working for and with the client (including 
active client participation in decision-making), and problem-solving.  It takes as its 
starting point the need to define what problems need to be addressed.  Then a practical 
analysis of each problem is undertaken with an aim of developing and implementing 
practical solutions to those problems. . . . [T]he lawyering approach focuses . . . narrowly; 
it assesses actual human needs based on actual conditions. . . . After needs are 
determined, a lawyering approach requires developing strategies to address needs 
revealed by the assessment, but without prejudging the utility of any particular structure 
or set of laws. . . . Under the lawyering approach the reformer’s palette is not 
monochromatic.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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development of a more uniform “new technological use” 
jurisprudence. 
C. Applying an Exclusive Rights Emphasis to Tasini, Random 
House, and Other “New Use” Disputes 
An exclusive rights emphasis could have proved useful in 
resolving some of the issues raised in Tasini and Random 
House.277  For example, in Tasini specific exclusive rights were 
referenced in some of the licenses at issue.278  With respect to such 
agreements, where the new technological use or application 
involves an exclusive right other than those expressly referenced in 
the license agreement, the licensee would be hard pressed under an 
exclusive rights emphasis to argue that he or she has a license to 
engage in the additional exclusive right and the concomitant new 
technological use.  Thus, as in Tasini, where the written license 
agreements expressly referenced the rights of reproduction and 
distribution, the licensee has no exclusive display right and is also 
precluded from engaging in activities that infringe upon that 
right.279 
In the situation in which the license agreement is expressed 
both in terms of a specific application for the work and specific 
exclusive rights, the reference to exclusive rights will control.  For 
example, in Random House, the license agreement authorized 
reproduction and distribution of the subject works “in book 
form.”280  Under an exclusive rights emphasis, the license does not 
grant any right exclusive rights beyond reproduction and 
 
277 In Greenberg, National Geographic relinquished all contractual rights in the 
copyrighted photograph prior to the events that gave rise to the litigation, hence the 
problem of interpreting a license was not an issue in that case. See Greenberg v. Nat’l 
Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001). 
278 See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d and 
remanded, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
279 Consequently, had the Supreme Court reached the issue in connection with such 
license agreements, under an exclusive rights approach the Court would have only to 
determine whether computer screen display is an activity subsumed within the copyright 
holder’s exclusive display right.  If so, the publishing licensees could not engage in 
unauthorized digital re-publication without infringing upon the contributory author’s 
exclusive rights. 
280 See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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distribution.  Thus, if computer screen display is eventually 
determined by the courts to be an activity within the exclusive 
display right, then the production of e-books is beyond the scope of 
the license.  The license only grants the exclusive rights to 
reproduce and distribute the work “in book form,” and because an 
e-book would involve the right of display, an e-book is essentially 
“a form of book” outside the scope of the license. 
Where the license agreement makes no reference to any 
exclusive rights whatsoever, an exclusive rights emphasis would 
require that assessment of the scope of the license begin with a 
determination of which of the enumerated exclusive rights are 
absolutely essential to any method for undertaking the application 
or activity described in the parties’ agreement.281  In as much as 
the parties obviously intended that the licensee engage in the 
specified activity, it is only reasonable to construe the license to 
permit the licensee to engage in those exclusive rights that are 
necessary to undertaking that activity.282  Otherwise, the licensee 
could not engage in the licensed activity under any circumstances, 
and the license would be rendered a nullity.283 
On the other hand, there may also be alternative methods 
available for engaging in the activity described in the license, 
whether existing as of the time of the parties’ contracting or 
developed subsequently during the license term.  To the extent that 
such alternative methods involve “non-essential” exclusive 
 
281 For example, different electronic publication methods or products can involve 
different exclusive rights.  If a specifically designated electronic use can be undertaken 
through a method or methods which involve only certain exclusive rights and without 
involving other exclusive rights, the court should construe the electronic use license to 
encompass only the narrowest range of exclusive rights—that is, only those exclusive 
rights essential to every method for engaging in the specified electronic activity. 
282 See, e.g., Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 621; Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. 
Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
283 This rule would also be of use in a variation of the situation in which the license has 
been expressed in terms of a particular kind of use and also specific exclusive rights, such 
as a license to reproduce and distribute a written work in digital media.  Obviously the 
rights of reproduction and distribution have been licensed, but what happens if the courts 
eventually determine that computer screen display encroaches upon the exclusive display 
right?  In as much as computer screen display is essential to all methods of digital media 
use, the license would be construed to extend to the display right, at least to the extent 
necessary to avoid nullification of the parties’ agreement. 
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rights—that is, exclusive rights that must be exercised in 
conjunction with some, but not all methods for undertaking the 
licensed activity—such non-essential exclusive rights/alternative 
methods are beyond the scope of the license.284  Because the 
parties failed to express their license agreement in terms of the 
exclusive rights, and because a license of any of the exclusive 
rights must be express in order to be effective, the license should 
be narrowly construed to extend to only those exclusive rights 
necessary to avoid the complete nullification of the parties’ 
agreement.  The lack of an express reference to the non-essential 
exclusive rights should therefore be construed as a reservation of 
such rights, as well as of any concomitant new technological uses, 
on the part of the copyright holder.285 
 
284 See Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1988); Nimmer, 
Licensing, supra note 238, at 127 (“One can license any of the [exclusive] rights, while 
retaining control of the others.  One can license or transfer such rights on an exclusive or 
a non-exclusive basis.  Similarly, one can subdivide any of the rights through limitations 
in a license. . . . [T]he important point is that a contract that grants one right (or part of it) 
does not imply that any other right is granted under the license.  Indeed, in the absence of 
other indicia of a broader agreement, a license conveys only what was expressly granted 
or what can reasonably be inferred from that express grant.  There is no assumption that a 
transferor (rights owner) grants all rights except those it expressly withholds.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
285 See Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, supra note 239, at 462 (“[A]lthough it is 
traditional to view copyright doctrine as a battle between the interests of copyright 
owners . . . and copyright users, in practice, those interests are remarkably congruent.  
Both sellers and buyers have a considerable stake in the maintenance of an orderly 
market with plentiful supplies of new works at reasonable prices.”); Nakos, supra note 
234, at 445–46 (“[I]f a technology did not exist when a licensing agreement was made, 
how can a court construe the agreement to have granted any rights in that technology . . .?  
While it strains reason to allow a court to randomly assign a rule in situations where 
certain uses, whether existing or new, are not addressed by the parties to the agreement, 
the line is crossed when uses not specifically reserved to the grantor are [construed as 
having been] transferred to the grantee.” (footnote omitted)).  Thus, describing the license 
in terms of specific uses for a work as opposed to specific exclusive rights increases 
uncertainty and the possibility of a windfall to one side.  The right to engage in 
subsequently developed methods for undertaking the specifically licensed activity would 
belong to the licensee, so long as such methods do not require engagement in any 
additional, i.e., “non-essential” exclusive rights.  On the other hand, new technological 
uses that require any non-essential exclusive rights would be deemed as reserved to the 
copyright holder. 
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D. The Presumption of “Technological Neutrality” 
One final new technological use canon of construction that 
would promote the expression of copyright license agreements in 
terms of the exclusive rights is a presumption of “technological 
neutrality.”  Such a presumption would mandate that the express 
license of an exclusive right be construed to extend to all 
technological means available to engage in that right, including 
those methods not in existence when the parties entered into their 
agreement, but have come into existence during the license term. 
In granting a license of an exclusive right, if the copyright 
holder wishes to limit the grant to specific or presently existing 
methods of engagement, he or she can state such restriction 
explicitly in the agreement.286  This can be easily accomplished by 
expressly limiting the license to methods currently in existence or 
through the use of some other appropriate reservation of rights 
language.287 
 
286 See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 487 
(2d Cir. 1998) (“[The words of the] license are more reasonably read to include than to 
exclude a motion picture distributed in video format . . . . [W]e conclude that the burden 
fell on [the copyright holder] to exclude new markets arising from subsequently 
developed motion picture technology, [and] to insert such language of limitation in the 
license, rather than on [the licensee] to add language that reiterated what the license 
already stated.”); Vermylen, supra note 92, at 194–95 (“Publishing contracts also 
traditionally contain a provision dealing with the license of electronic rights or rights in 
the work derived from ‘technologies not yet known’ or ‘other media.’ . . . As these 
technologies become ‘known’ rather than ‘not yet known’ and prove profitable, authors 
begin to reserve the right to license these rights in their works.  This reservation typically 
takes the form of either an express clause in the contract or a clause limiting the grant of 
rights to only those traditional print forms listed in the contract . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
287 See Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 487–88 (“[S]ignificant jurisprudential and policy 
considerations confirm . . . our view [that construing a general grant of rights to include 
new use technologies] is more consistent with the law of contract than the view that 
would exclude new technologies even when they reasonably fall within the description of 
what is licensed.  Although contract interpretation normally requires inquiry into the 
intent of the contracting parties, intent is not likely to be helpful when the subject of the 
inquiry is something the parties were not thinking about.”); see also Michael R. Fuller, 
Hollywood Goes Interactive: Licensing Problems Associated with Re-Purposing Motion 
Pictures into Interactive Multimedia Videogames, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 599, 612 (1995) 
(“If the words . . . are broad enough to cover the new use, it seems fairer that the burden 
of framing and negotiating an exception should fall on the grantor . . . .”). But see Nakos, 
supra note 236, at 455–57 (arguing in favor of a strict interpretation approach, such that 
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Placing upon the copyright holder the responsibility of 
reserving a technological limitation on the express license of an 
exclusive right is an approach consistent with the provisions of the 
Copyright Act as well as copyright public policy.288  Moreover, a 
presumption in favor of technological neutrality is not a bias in 
favor of publishing licensees.  It merely preserves the parties’ 
actual bargain, or perhaps more accurately, it resolves issues the 
parties failed to address in a manner consistent with traditional 
contract canons and copyright policy objectives.289 
We acknowledge that a result which deprives the author-
licensor of participation in the profits of new unforeseen 
channels of distribution is not an altogether happy solution.  
Nonetheless, we think it more fair and sensible than a result 
that would deprive a contracting party of the rights 
reasonably found in the terms of the contract it negotiates.  
This issue is too often, and improperly, framed as one of 
favoritism as between licensors and licensees.  Because 
licensors are often authors—whose creativity the copyright 
laws intend to nurture—and are often impecunious, while 
licensees are often large business organizations, there is 
sometimes a tendency in copyright scholarship and 
adjudication to seek solutions that favor licensors over 
licensees. . . . 
 
any use not expressly provided for in the license would be considered reserved by the 
licensor). 
288 Copyright protection is afforded to appropriate works upon fixation in any medium, 
“now known or later developed.” 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (2003); see Boosey & Hawkes, 145 
F.3d at 488 n.4 (“[A]n approach to new-use problems that tilts against licensees gives rise 
to antiprogressive incentives.  [For example, m]otion picture producers would be 
reluctant to explore and utilize innovative technologies for the exhibition of movies if the 
consequence would be that they would lose the right to exhibit pictures containing 
licensed works.”). 
289 See Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 152–55 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(“In the end, decision must turn . . . on a choice between two basic approaches [to dealing 
with new technological uses] more than on an attempt to distill decisive meaning out of 
language that very likely had none.” (citation omitted)); NBC v. Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“[Copyright] ownership is itself 
dependent on the contractual terms [between the parties]; it cannot be settled without 
reference to those terms.”). 
MTIMA FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:21 PM 
2004] TASINI AND ITS PROGENY 457 
In our view, new-use analysis should rely on neutral 
principals of contract interpretation rather than solicitude 
for either party. . . . If the contract is more reasonably read 
to convey one meaning, the party benefitted [sic] by that 
reading should be able to rely upon it. . . . This principle 
favors neither licensors nor licensees.  It follows simply 
from the words of the contract.290 
A presumption of technological neutrality equally favors and 
disfavors both licensor and licensee.291  As described above, the 
presumption would enable licensees to engage in subsequently 
developed methods for undertaking expressly licensed exclusive 
rights.  On the other hand, a new technological use that 
incorporates exclusive rights other than those referenced in the 
agreement, for example, a new method of reproduction that also 
utilizes the right of distribution, would be deemed beyond the 
scope of the license, if only the right of reproduction is referenced 
in the license.292 
While the new technological use of digital re-publication 
presents a novel challenge to the traditional copyright framework, 
it also provides an opportunity to address the nettlesome 
inconsistencies between the business of copyright licensing and the 
 
290 Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 487; see also Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books 
LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 622–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
291 See Nakos, supra note 236, at 443 n.49 (“At the heart of the controversy over the 
rights to exploit a work in a new medium is the potential revenue that this medium may 
generate to whomever possesses those rights.  When a new use surfaces, it does not alter 
the original rights conveyed by the contract.  Instead, a case typically ‘involves 
circumstances so changed that the deal looks less attractive now than when struck.’” 
(quoting Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 538 F. Supp. 211, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1982))). 
292 See Nakos, supra note 236, at 434 (“In the case of a licensing agreement that fails to 
place the rights to newly developed means of exploitation of the licensed work, any 
ambiguity should be construed in favor of the licensor: a strict approach to interpreting 
copyright licensing agreements, reserving all uses not expressly granted to the licensor, is 
the best approach.”).  While resolving any ambiguity in favor of the licensor goes too far, 
the basic argument that copyrights must be expressly transferred is of course sound.  
However, when a copyright owner expressly licenses an exclusive right and does so 
without any explicit reservation or restriction, construing the license to include all 
methods for engaging in that right that are (or become) available during the license term 
merely implements the express provisions of the license, as well as copyright policy. 
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mandates of the copyright law.293  Other than when the entire 
copyright is being assigned, traditional publishing boilerplate has 
proven an inadequate means by which to authorize new and 
sometimes even traditional uses of copyrighted material, or to 
license any exclusive rights essential or incidental to such 
activities.294  By expressing the license in terms of the exclusive 
rights, the parties make clear which of the copyright holder’s 
actual property rights are the subject of the their agreement, and 
also provide a roadmap for the resolution of any disputes that 
might arise in connection with the development of new 
technological application relevant to their agreement.295 
 
293 See Jamar, supra note 276, at 41–44 (“The core attributes of a lawyering approach 
are: (1) professionalism, (2) client-centeredness, and (3) problem-solving. . . . When the 
three core elements of the lawyering approach are considered together, one is forced into 
a process-oriented approach . . . . Client centeredness and client involvement in the 
problem-solving process ensure an emphasis on inclusion and process rather than 
exclusion and fiat.” (footnotes omitted)). 
294 See J. Michael Huget & Sarah K. Fisher, Put It in Writing: The Extent of Rights 
Acquired on a Copyrightable Work Should Be Agreed upon Ahead of Time, 80 MICH. B.J. 
50, 51 (Nov. 2001) (“The difficulty that arose in Tasini is that the publishers did not 
obtain copyright ownership for the articles at issue; as a result, they merely had a license 
to publish the articles in their publications.  Given that the license did not address the 
issue of electronic databases, the publishers were at the mercy of judicial 
interpretation. . . . Thus, the lesson from Tasini is simple . . . : it is imperative for any 
person or company hiring an independent contractor to create a copyrightable work to 
agree in writing, before the work is begun, on the extent of the rights to be acquired from 
the independent contractor.  The lack of a written agreement will ensure that the 
independent contractor will retain the copyright ownership, along with the right to license 
and further exploit the work.”). 
295 See NBC, 848 F.2d at 1293 (“[C]opyrights, or any of their individual constituent 
parts, are freely alienable. . . . The Copyright Act aids commercial exploitation of 
copyrights by allowing the sale of particular rights—such as movie rights or rights to 
perform a popular song—or of the entire bundle.  The intent of the parties, as expressed 
in their contracting, therefore can determine who enjoys copyright protection for certain 
rights. . . . Only reference to the parties’ intent can indicate the relevant owner.  The goals 
of the alienability and divisibility of copyrights would, of course, be subverted if private 
contracts were not enforced properly.” (citations omitted)); see also Boosey & Hawkes, 
145 F.3d at 484–91; Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 154–55 (2d 
Cir. 1968); Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 617–22; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 
53, § 26.02[C][1]–[2]; Ginsburg, supra note 255, at 954–73; Rosenzweig, supra note 
255, at 908–18. 
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CONCLUSION 
The copyright issues presented by digital re-publication affect 
virtually every existing printed work not in the public domain.  
Whether regarded as an entirely sui generis activity or a 
combination of existing exclusive rights, digital re-publication is 
fast becoming the principal means for archiving printed works.  
The advent of digital re-publication not only eliminates the need 
for possession of individual copies of specific works, but facilitates 
their dissemination to larger audiences than ever. 
As Tasini and its progeny demonstrate, however, relatively few 
existing works have been published pursuant to agreements that 
encompass their use in electronic media.  Consequently, the legal 
mechanisms through which digital re-publication is accomplished 
will continue to be a source of conflict in the publishing industry.  
Publishers are likely to continue to utilize their superior bargaining 
leverage to secure digital re-publication rights without paying 
additional compensation to most copyright holders.296  For their 
part, authors and authors’ organizations will work to devise 
accessible writer compensation mechanisms, whereby cooperative 
publishers might easily pay digital re-publication royalties to 
copyright owners.  Various writers’ groups have already organized 
“copyright clearinghouses” to collect and distribute digital re-
publication royalties, borrowing from methods employed in the 
recording industry for decades.297 
 
296 See Springer, supra note 236, at 349 (“With the risk of liability ‘too great to allow 
any other course of action,’ The Times has engaged in an on-going process of removing 
those freelance articles with unsecured rights from electronic archives.  At the same time, 
The Times has set up a process for allowing freelance authors to allow their submissions 
to remain in the electronic archives if they should so desire.”). 
297 See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 2, at 253 (“In addition to individual contracts 
between freelance authors and publishers, two payment systems are currently employed 
to compensate authors directly for the use of their work in electronic media.  ‘The 
Authors Registry is a non-profit organization formed to help expedite the flow of royalty 
payments and small re-use fees from publisher to author,’ and includes over 100 literary 
agencies and represents 50,000 writers.  In addition, the Publication Rights 
Clearinghouse, which was formed by the National Writers Union, ‘pays a copyright fee 
of 30% of its delivery price,’ deducting a twenty percent administration cost for union 
members.  The clearinghouse mostly secures royalties in the fields of full-text databases, 
Web sites, and other similar electronic media.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Albanese, 
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In those cases in which publishers and authors remain at a 
digital re-publication impasse, however, the fair use doctrine 
provides an appropriate method for balancing the competing 
interests in a socially responsible manner.  Indeed, the availability 
and application of the fair use doctrine may well foster the 
development of consensual mechanisms for digital re-publication.  
Given that the question of fair use is extremely fact sensitive, both 
publishers and authors alike have a powerful incentive to work 
toward non-judicial resolutions of their digital re-publication 
disputes.298 
Moreover, many a digital re-publication standoff will present 
attractive broker/mediator opportunities for third-party electronic 
re-publishers.  Entities such as NEXIS can not only bring 
additional resources to the negotiation table, but may also have the 
most to gain from the expeditious resolution of digital re-
publication conflicts.299 
Finally, with respect to both new and existing works, the 
widespread adoption of an exclusive rights emphasis in copyright 
licensing would aid in facilitating digital re-publication as well as 
other new technological uses for copyrighted works.  The 
consistent demonstration of a judicial preference for an exclusive 
rights construction/allocation approach to new technological use 
disputes would assist authors and publishers in evaluating their 
respective positions under existing publishing contracts, and also 
encourage participants in the publishing trade to improve and 
conform current licensing practices.  This would diminish the 
 
supra note 244, at 14; Reed, supra note 56, at 1106, 1110–11; Soares, supra note 56,  
¶¶ 24–25. 
298 See, e.g., Anderson & Brown, supra note 111, at 144 (“Many who have looked at the 
relationship between copyright protection and the fair use defense have concluded that 
finding a fair use is, at best, a matter of balancing hard-to-define equitable considerations, 
or at worst, a matter of luck.  Additionally, for those of the orthodox school, obtaining a 
fair use exception in court is simply a matter of marshalling more emotionally appealing 
equities for fair use than the creator of the work can offer against fair use.  Most of the 
copyright commentators have argued that the fair use case law is largely unprincipled and 
unpredictable.” (footnotes omitted)). 
299 For example, in a typical digital re-publication dispute, electronic publishers such as 
NEXIS could offer to negotiate independent arrangements with writers’ groups, while 
presenting lucrative re-publication opportunities to both sides that could only be obtained 
through author/publisher cooperation. 
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number and complexity of such disputes, as well as the need for 
judicial intervention in such matters.  Such progress will assure 
widespread digital re-publication and increased digital 
dissemination of printed copyrighted works, all to the greater 
public good. 
 
